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THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF HENRI DE NAVARRE

1585-1595

by



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A THESIS

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ABSTRACT

Between 1585 and 1595, Henri de Navarre and the Protestant French Huguenots were engaged in a bitter struggle for survival with the powerful Catholic Holy League. Although ultimately successful, Navarre's party held a minority position which enjoyed only limited means and relied for much of its support on politique nobles, who placed traditional loyalties to the throne above loyalties to the church; great aristocrats who despised the League and its leadership, the House of Guise; and less honourable men who saw unity with Navarre as a means to a material end. The Huguenots were strengthened further by Navarre's succession to the throne as Henri IV in 1589 and his conversion in 1593, which ended the religious differences between the king and his people and attracted past enemies to his party in droves.

To maintain the unity of such a variegated collection of men, individual leadership was of the utmost importance. A gifted general and a thorough administrator, Henri IV was thrust into a position that required subtle skills in politics and diplomacy as well as military affairs. Yet his military capacity has been the subject of casual debate for almost 400 years. Modern historians have criticized him for apparent faults in his military command after only superficial study of his strategy, removed from the context of accompanying conditions that add meaning to his actions. Contemporaries praised him abundantly, but it is difficult to determine how much was sincere and how much was flattery designed to attract royal patronage. However, it is commonly agreed by both that



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Navarre was skillful in tactics and shrewd in politics so that his personal example often tipped the balance in his favour.

This thesis examines the role of Navarre's military leadership in the period of the last of the French religious wars, 1585-1595. After a brief introduction to the controversy, Chapter I investigates the formation and organization of the Huguenot army from the raw material at hand, and the problems and limitations that affected it. Chapter II considers individuals within the party's high command and their personal relationships with Navarre. Chapter III explores the major problems and factions which divided Henri's supporters and which threatened his own position as well as the unity of his party. Finally, this thesis concludes with an assessment of the influence of the many problems faced by Navarre and the limitations these problems placed on his actions, and a consideration of the controversy in light of the evidence presented.

PREFACE

On 17 July 1585 King Henri III of France, the last of the ruling Valois line, revoked the edicts of toleration of 1577 in a solemn session of the Parlement of Paris. Succumbing finally to relentless pressure from the Catholic Holy League, the weak-willed and vacillating monarch revoked the only existing safeguards--guaranteed by the crown--for the preservation of Calvinist worship in the kingdom. By thus precipitating a new effort aimed against French Protestantism, the League--under the auspices of the ambitious Guise family--provoked the eighth and last civil war in the lengthy religious struggle after a brief period of relative calm. Faced with possible physical extinction, the Huguenots quickly gathered arms and, under the leadership of King Henri de Navarre (after 1589 Henri IV of France), organized resistance to the armies of the Valois monarch and the League, the latter receiving covert aid from Spain. The war was to last for ten years, until January 1595 when Henri IV declared war formally on Spain, ending thirty-three long years of civil war and opening the first chapter of the Bourbon-Habsburg struggle.

Henri IV's ultimate success, although by no means initially expected by many contemporaries, pivoted largely on his inspired leadership. A gifted general and a thorough administrator, the king of Navarre was thrust into a position that required subtle skills in politics and diplomacy as well as military affairs. These skills were enhanced further by the unique personal aspect of his leadership. Yet, for 400 years the king of Navarre has been criticized for apparent faults in his military

command by historians who have followed his campaigns on a rather superficial level without considering accompanying conditions and who have based most of their criticism upon remarks attributed to a single contemporary. This presents a striking contrast to remarks left by the majority of contemporaries who believed the value of the king's military leadership to be considerable.

It is commonly agreed that the king of Navarre was skillful in tactics and shrewd in politics so that his personal example often tipped the balance in his favour. However, his critics have assaulted him for four military weaknesses: first, he failed to follow-up his victories; second, his preference for cavalry negated any developments being made in infantry and artillery; third, he over-exposed himself in battle, leading all attacks personally and risking death for the sake of personal glory; fourth, and most important, he had no understanding of the greater science of strategy. Alleging these faults, some historians have concluded that Henri de Navarre was chiefly responsible for the duration of the last religious-civil war.

The prince of Parma serves most of Henri's critics as their best authority. Leaving France in 1590, after his first invasion, he allegedly advised Mayenne to distract Henri IV with truce overtures and sorties, "because time and temporizing will sooner ruin that prince than force, this Béarnais uses his boots more than his shoes". In 1592, on his second invasion, Parma clashed with Henri near Aumale. Parma was surprised apparently to find the king in the front ranks, remarking, "I expected to

see a general: this is only an officer of light cavalry!" When Henri was forced to withdraw, Parma allegedly said that he thought the king's retreat was "gallant" but for his part believed that he would never get himself into a position where he was forced to retire. Although the only source for these remarks is Bishop Péréfixe, later historians have seized on these observations attributed to Parma, the recognized master of sixteenth century warfare, and built a damning case upon them, delighting especially in comparing the merits of the two men. Agrippa d'Aubigné, another contemporary, cast stones at Henri's leadership, particularly after the battle of Coutras when he wrote that the king sacrificed the fruits of victory on the altar of love; and his remarks have been used as further evidence to support those of Parma.

Thus, a tradition of criticism grew against Henri de Navarre. Early in the twentieth century Pierre de Vaissière agreed that Henri was tactically expert and that his personal élan and inspiration to his men aided his cause; but while never openly criticizing Henri, he implied the king's inability in the field of strategy. Also, drawing on the observations of others while exploring possible reasons for failure, Vaissière tacitly supported the view that Henri was negligent in taking advantage of victory. General Maxime Weygand, like Vaissière, appreciated the king's tactical skill and "the force of his personality", but claimed he was nothing of a military theorist, comparing him unfavourably to Parma.

Among English critics, Sir Charles Oman stands paramount. Relying on the authority of Parma and a comparison of the brilliant general

with Navarre, in the 1930's Oman openly criticized Henri's faults in the field, concluding that most setbacks to the Huguenot cause were attributable to the king. Lynn Montross, an American, echoed Oman's observations later, but continued, like the others, to praise the king's ability as a tactician and his resourcefulness. The most recent criticism of the king of Navarre was offered in the 1970's; Keegan and Wheatcroft wrote in Who's Who in Military History that the king's skills lay in the challenges of a battlefield commander rather than in the higher planning or organization of war, and that Henri acted like a common cavalryman. They added further that Henri's preference was for irregular warfare, that he never mastered the skills of strategy and that his clash with Parma showed his limitations as a commander.

Contemporary accounts vehemently disagree with all this. Hailed as a Caesar, "this princelike souldier and souldierlike Prince" was described as active, applying himself wholly to a campaign until its finish; thorough; decisive, prudent and eager to follow plans with action; impatient with long deliberations but willing to seek and accept good advice; giving credit where due; knowing how to delegate authority; appreciating talent; honourable, sympathetic, forgiving, easy-going and compassionate. Although he enjoyed the pleasures of kingship, war was taken seriously. Péréfixe wrote that he never sat at a table longer than a quarter hour and never slept for more than two or three hours. Michel Hurault wrote that the king was "so earnest about that which is laide before him, and so bestirring himself about the yron that ought to

bee strooken whiles it is hotte, that he regardeth lesse what is passed, and what is to come: he will not conceive much any farrefetched practices, beeing content with his hope, and referring all upon it".

There were only three nineteenth century authors who appreciated Henri's ability. The duc d'Aumale wrote that "he was restless for the present, [while] his eyes were fixed always on the future; discouragements never won his heart, and the extinction of the struggle never troubled his higher reason". Colonel F. Reboul agreed with this and, considering Henri and Parma, concluded that they represented two different schools of warfare which could not be compared with fairness. Joseph Guadet echoed these thoughts, cautioning his own contemporaries not to judge Navarre's activities using nineteenth century standards. However, despite their support they never really tackled all of the major criticisms, being content to defend Henri's actions after his battles or his self-exposure to danger. Reboul came close to defending Henri's strategic ability but stopped short, while no one defended his preference for cavalry.

The purpose of this study, then, is to determine which school of thought is correct. On the one hand stands the majority of contemporaries who praise the king and his leadership; on the other, stands the majority of modern historians who condemn the king for his faults in military leadership. Were the contemporaries correct, drawing upon personal experience and their knowledge of current conditions in support of the king, or were they simply sycophants who were more interested in securing royal patronage through flattery than in telling the truth? Are the

modern scholars correct, drawing upon contemporary sources and the advantage of hindsight, or are they critics who base their comments on statements allegedly made by a man whose struggle with the king killed him and on superficial study of military campaigns, neglecting the conditions that must be considered to pass a judgement of any value?

An attempt will be made, then, to review as many as possible of the original sources available and the major secondary works in order to determine whether or not Henri de Navarre was a gifted general. The focus of attention will be placed not on the various campaigns, which would reveal only a nice study of sixteenth century warfare, but instead on the organization of Navarre's army, the conditions within its high command and Henri IV's own leadership in molding the raw material available into an effective force that could defeat the powerful League. Only by studying the conditions and limitations placed upon the king of Navarre within these categories can a fair solution be found.

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✂ LAND BATTLES

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CHAPTER I

THE CONTENDING ARMIES

By and large, sixteenth century armies remained medieval in nature, while new developments in firepower and tactics--encouraged in élite units and by individual commanders--which required professional skill, rendered them increasingly obsolete. Bound together loosely through ancient pledges of kinship and feudal obligation, they were still raised in the spring and disbanded in the fall after the campaigning season, so newly achieved gains were jeopardized and long range plans were impossible. Especially in a country torn by civil war, individual commanders relied heavily upon family members and the client system--complete with retainers--to raise armies. More than one great family fell to ruin as a result of the crushing financial burden of warfare, for finding men and the money to pay them became increasingly difficult.

During the last of the religious wars in France, the Catholic Holy League and the Huguenot Party faced similar problems in leadership, recruitment, discipline and supply. For the most part armies remained small, a single force in the field rarely surpassing 10,000 men in number and often numbering considerably fewer; the Huguenot forces in particular were always understrength. Efficient means of raising troops simply did not exist, and once raised, their unfortunate officers were immediately faced with keeping the men tied to the company colours. Given the woeful lack of money for payment--often long in arrears, some soldiers

stayed with the colours merely on the basis of receiving at least one meal a day, a powerful motive for many in a land torn by civil upheaval, famine and disease. In any case, the soldier deserted whenever he chose to, and this desertion depleted the ranks far more seriously than enemy musketry.

Nor were the officers much more respectable than the men they led. All too often they were ruffians unskilled in command and uneducated in warfare, whose only attribute was courage, though the majority were of noble blood. As entrepreneurs of a kind, company captains were able to sell their services to the highest bidder, and in a civil war they were frequently able to leave one army to join the enemy for reasons of material gain.

Thus it was that most leaders sought the services of foreign mercenaries. Hired on a contractual basis, these soldiers fought faithfully until the contract expired, the money ran out or their flag was taken in battle. Then they were at their liberty to follow whomsoever they wished--usually he who was willing to pay most. Nevertheless, they represented the professionals who were skilled in the use of their weapons and fearless in battle. It was around their companies that most leaders liked to mold a fighting force of raw recruits.

Henri de Navarre relied as heavily upon mercenaries to swell the ranks of his army as did his enemies. The Swiss or German soldier frequently proved to be his only recourse, and it is probable that foreign units normally constituted a third of Henri's armed force while it is

possible that their numbers sometimes reached as high as a half. A contemporary historian defined mercenaries as men "who sell them selves to dye at other mens commandement, never considering the justice of the cause", noting that "these shameless Mercenaries . . . will make no warre longer than they are fed with money".¹ He was entirely correct in his observations if not entirely fair.

In the late sixteenth century the most popular mercenary soldiers were still the Swiss, and they were sought eagerly by Henri at the beginning of the war in 1585, although it was not until 1587 that they actually marched in his service. Indeed, the diplomatic skills of Harlay de Sancy were entirely used by Henri to raise these valuable troops until 1592 when he returned to the king's side. The Swiss represented the apex of military professionalism, whose traditional training and courage gave them a speed and skill on the battlefield rarely matched. Largely pikemen, they did not adapt well to the new advances in firearms, and they remained to Henri the basis of his pike strength. While ruthless and with "a strongly commercial attitude to war", they refused to fight their fellow countrymen.²

The second most sought after force was the German lansquenet infantry. In a memorandum to the duc de Lesdiguières regarding the lease of mercenaries, the sieur de Quित्रy wrote, ". . . and if the Swiss should be prevented by their own affairs, they [the recruiting agents] may take lansquenets in their place".³ They were almost as highly regarded as the Swiss, with whom they were bitter enemies;⁴ their internal discipline

was strict and, unlike the Swiss, the lansquenets would fight their own kind.

The last most eagerly sought mercenary was the Reiter, a German cavalryman usually armed with sword and pistols rather than the lance. Organized into large squadrons of 300 to 350 men, their tactics involved heavy use of the pistols; their efficiency in battle was highly praised by the French, who reported that "a man could see nothing but fire and steel".⁵

Apart from these three more obvious sources of manpower, Henri de Navarre was able to rely upon other foreign elements in smaller numbers to increase his strength. The duc de Montmorency was served by Italian cavalry in Languedoc;⁶ Queen Elizabeth I of England sent a total of 20,000 soldiers to help the Huguenots between 1589 and 1594; Maurice of Nassau offered Dutch support, and King James VI of Scotland sent as many men as his limited financial resources allowed.⁷ These volunteers and allied contributions so counterbalanced the adverse public image of mercenaries that one contemporary observed that the foreigners aiding Henri de Navarre "come onely of obedience and good will to serve him. By reason whereof they do us none other discommodity, than onely that we pay them their wages: whereas our enemies find themselves more cumbered with their succours, then with our warres".⁸ Moreover, the mercenaries in Henri's armies, unlike those of the League, were kept under full control. "He reduced them to the state of auxilliaries in the service of the kingdom, as had been the Swiss since the reign of

Louis XI."⁹ Agrippa d'Aubigné colourfully described a company of mercenaries in his Histoire Universelle:

They made war, collected taxes, and took prisoners. I do not hesitate to describe their way of life, not because of its excellence, but its novelty. They were around 400 men who ate together in the market places, the captain and minister at the head of the tables, and at the foot, which was in several sections, were interspersed the lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants, and other officers. Because of the booty they took, they were all tarred with the same brush, and that is why the captains did not differ from their comrades either in the matter of food or clothing, and were allowed to wear only a little gold chain around the neck to distinguish them; the squad leaders and other members had only red cords on their caps. It would take quite a time to tell of the hazardous exploits of these gallants on various occasions.¹⁰

Highly regarded as mercenaries were, a small party like the Huguenots could hardly afford their expensive services. Thus, Henri de Navarre was compelled to fall back upon his French coreligionists. Fortunately the Huguenot soldiers also were of high quality, for twenty-five years of almost continuous warfare had made a veteran of every male Protestant able to bear arms. This was an advantage that the League never enjoyed; amongst the numerous Catholic peasantry, the League leaders could raise recruits at will, but the majority of these were raw as Catholic forces in the earlier wars had been primarily professionals.

There were, apart from mercenary service, three traditional means of regional recruitment available to French kings. The king had recourse to the ban et arrière-ban by which every man of noble birth might be called upon to serve. A surviving vestige of the age of feudalism, it had fallen into disuse by the middle of the sixteenth century; yet it was still a legal and legitimate form of recruitment. The milice was a

contingent levied annually for local protection, and as a local institution it usually escaped being absorbed by the royal army. Finally, the levée en masse was a method by which the peasantry was instructed to follow the local nobility into the king's service, but by 1585 the levée was generally ineffective.¹¹

A relatively new and the most efficient method of recruitment was through agreements with officers, or more properly entrepreneurs, to raise a company of men by means of a subsidy called "la montre", provided by a military leader.¹² Unable to hire enough individual soldiers themselves, both the royal government and private parties fell back on the entrepreneurs who were obligated to furnish a company of men--clothed, equipped and armed, over whom the entrepreneur received control as captain; the company was literally owned by its captain and could be sold, traded for a title or passed to a relative through inheritance. Comparable rights rested in the hands of the regimental commander, usually a nobleman, who was commissioned to collect a number of these companies together. The system offered ample opportunity for graft, but sufficient numbers of men were raised through this means to provide armies,¹³ and above all else Henri de Navarre needed men, especially in proportion to the numbers available to his enemies. He recognized his armies as "the only basis of my authority and conservation of the State".¹⁴

Using the contract-commission system, men could be raised easily and quickly. In 1585 the vicomte de Turenne received a commission "to raise regiments and companies of cavalry". He wrote: "At this I worked

so diligently, that in less than five weeks I collected five to six thousand infantrymen, and five to six hundred horse. . . ."15 And there were comparable achievements elsewhere. The sieur de Tavannes, Henri's lieutenant in Burgundy, distributed the king's money for four commissions to raise a regiment of five or six hundred arquebusiers, and this was done in a relatively short period of time--particularly admirable as Burgundy was the duc de Mayenne's gouvernement and the surrounding counties were heavily Catholic.¹⁶

Navarre's army was primarily dependent on the troops provided by the Protestant churches, and Catholic sympathizers through local military organizations which devised a systematic form of regional conscription. The duc de Montpensier left behind him a fine record of this system of recruitment for the Catholic regiments, later noting that the religious requirement was, of course, different in Huguenot formations. In every bishopric, bailiwick or vicounty a general was chosen to act in the roles of commander-in-chief and coordinator for the local troops. As a general, he "must be a Gentleman of mark, a good member [of the church], a good Catholicke, and devoide of anie suspition of favouring any part, but God and his Prince . . . & the tranquillitie of his Countrie".¹⁷ No other man than the local bailiff himself should be chosen so that it was assured "hee bee a Gentleman" who knew local conditions and could rely on local loyalties, and whose title already carried with it military authority in the area.¹⁸ He was required to levy in every parish troops "according to the greatnesse and riches of the parish". Montpensier also warned

"that the labour & Business of the common people be not ceased, & interrupted"; it was they, after all, who paid the soldiers' wages, bought weapons and financed the means for their own defence through taxes on their industry. Yet, in all cases, they were to be governed carefully by martial law to prevent treachery by reluctant citizens facing a long siege and a possible sack, and to ensure that daily life remained orderly, organized and uninterrupted whether under threat by enemy troops or not.

It is clear that Navarre's commanders understood the foundations of Henri's defence, and there is every indication that it was along these lines that they prepared. Without the resources available to the League, Protestant forces for the most part remained tied to their locale, for it would have been foolhardy to attempt an offensive before 1589; even Henri de Navarre's four great victories were fought as defensive actions and not as climaxes to an offensive campaign. Judging from the memoirs, it would appear that these troops generally remained regional in attitude, and even Henri found it impossible to keep them tied to his flag after battles like Coutras, Ivry and the siege of Rouen; they considered themselves "borrowed" for a short campaign and were always eager to return home after gaining some success. In effect, they were a militia force who jealously guarded their territorial rights. The problems implicit in this pattern were recognized by Henri in a letter to the duc de Montpensier, saying, ". . . [I see] my army composed of volunteer nobility, and that of my enemies settled and newly paid".¹⁹ Fortunately for Henri, through support from the country and his allies he could escape some of the worst

problems,²⁰ and the quality of his soldiers remained higher than that of his Catholic adversaries. For example, Parma was impressed by the soldiers he encountered at Chelles in 1590 on his first invasion of France, saying to Mayenne:

Be these the ten thousand men, which you assured mee would bee so easily overcome? There appeares above five and twenty thousand in the best order that I have seen.²¹

The Huguenot soldier showed high morale in battle, as he was promised extra rewards for good service and bravery in action.²²

Religion also played a major role in morale. Before each of Henri's battles, the Protestant soldiers, united in a common cause, knelt with their king in prayer in the full knowledge that God was on their side; and after prayers, the ministers took their places in the ranks, "and cast off ecclesiastical robes to don the armour of a warrior".²³ Of course, Catholic forces offered prayers, too, but contemporary memoirists clearly believed that the Huguenots had the advantage in fervour and confidence. Perhaps even the evangelical fervour and confidence of salvation of Protestant soldiers may have bolstered their morale.

Yet discipline remained a chronic problem. Many comparisons were drawn between the foreign troops serving Henri de Navarre and his French soldiers by critical observers. Claude Groulart observed on 1 March 1592, when Maurice of Nassau sent 2,000 soldiers to aid Henri in his siege of Rouen, that: "they made a very good sight, because there was only one cart per company to carry the arms of the captains, and in all some twenty [wagons]. The soldiers carried their arms and their

harquebuses, and behaved with discipline, which is not in the least observed in France".²⁴

Nor was the Huguenot army without its incidents of mutiny. On one occasion in Languedoc, a small force of Protestants encountered a larger force of Catholics led by Joyeuse, and only with difficulty were the commanders able to hold back their men--especially the cavalry, when they considered a charge against superior numbers over inferior ground too dangerous to leave to chance. The mutinous troops actually complained to Constable Montmorency, but after some deliberation the constable agreed with his commanders and forced the troops back into their ranks.²⁵

Henri de Navarre's officer corps was composed for the most part of noblemen, despite a few great family names mostly from the lower nobility or squirearchy. Apart from a common sense of independence, what all noble officers shared was their attention to their outfit. Henri de Navarre begged them that they not be extravagant in personal pleasures, like fine clothing,²⁶ but it is doubtful many could afford to do so. What most were able to afford was a good horse, a sword and perhaps a helmet and cuirass, and even this could be expensive.²⁷ In 1589, in a skirmish with some League cavalry, Sully broke two swords and was forced to have recourse to a pair of pistols, loaded with armour-piercing steel bullets.²⁸ Both items were expensive, and when added to the cost of body armour, horse furniture, personal needs and the needs of one's retainers, war was an expensive adventure for everyone and financially crushing for some. The sieur de Saint-Auban (one of the duc de Châtillon's lieutenants) was more

typical of the Protestant nobility. At the siege of Coupeyre in August 1586, he recorded in his memoirs: "I have in truth a good Arabian horse who serves me very well; but I was much at a disadvantage in my weapons, having only a mere cuirass, like a light cuirass and gilt, without a helmet, no brassards, no boots".²⁹ However, the lack of means to provide themselves with a suitable outfit (as few noblemen were paid anything by the king) did not prevent the majority of Henri's officers from serving him faithfully and well.

But if the soldier proved difficult to discipline, then the officer proved to be almost impossible. The noble officer brought with him the careless and easy manner of one who considers his family name superior to all others. This was further aggravated in Henri's army by the complete absence of a formal command structure. The lack of permanency of rank and hierarchical structure left a vacuum in the army which was filled with insubordination in the very class which should have been most obedient, and the indiscipline attributed to the soldiers can as easily be blamed on the men who led them. For instance, at Pont-de-Cé Condé lost much of his initial advantage due to the insubordination of several officers, and finally, on the advice of his council, he withdrew during the night.³⁰ Before the battle of Arques (1589), although expressly forbidden to engage the enemy, a young officer disobeyed and his entire command was either killed or captured, and he himself was wounded.³¹

Lack of money was another problem which plagued Henri's army from the beginning of the war until its finish. Henri sometimes suffered

from an insufficiency of specie to the point where the only method of payment remaining was to allow the troops to sack a town. This was not uncommon, and available sources make constant reference to it. It was very difficult to control unpaid men, even when led by a man as able and prestigious as the king of Navarre. Hence, St. Gelais fell to him by a surprise attack on a moonless night in December 1588; but, "when the day began to appeare, the souldiers wandred about for the spoyle which was made in the houses . . . and so much as was done, happened because it was impossible for the leaders wholly to repress it. . . ." Yet it is remarkable that the looting was unaccompanied by either murder or rape, although the sack was unstoppable.³²

Equally serious was the flat refusal by unpaid troops to fight or even to march until past arrears had been made up. Henri was unable to place himself quickly enough before Paris after his victory at Ivry (1590) largely because his troops--especially the mercenaries--had refused to march until they were paid.

Nor was Henri so confident of his own abilities to control his troops that he took unnecessary risks. In 1590 the king was eventually forced to raise the second siege of Paris, largely due to the arrival of a Spanish relief army, led by the prince of Parma. However, one observer recorded that the Protestant king had another reason in mind. Navarre, "considering that Paris was the head Citie and principal ornament of his Realme", called off the siege because he did not want Paris burned, sacked or innocent people harmed. "Also that the souldiers seeing themselves so

neere to so good a bootie, should have been hardly reffrained from proceeding farther, as in deed it was the greatest labour that the king and the chiefest of his Captaines had during the whole siege [of four months], to refraine their souldiours from anie farther enterprise. . . ."33

The cost of an army was terrific. Any general who chose to lead his forces into a field battle gambled dangerously that he would win. The loss of an army meant a serious blow to any country's finances, while to the Huguenots--operating without access to a royal treasury--it would have been an irreparable loss. In 1585 Henri de Navarre formed an agreement with his Protestant German and English allies in which they would raise and help to pay for a large mercenary army to march to support him, but it was not until the summer of 1587 that the army was ready. Initially 190,000 francs were raised to pay for it. A further 60,000 francs were raised to pay for twenty-two cannon of varying calibres. Some 300 draught horses were needed to haul the guns; each supply wagon was pulled by five horses; 300 horses more were needed to pull the ammunition wagons--the total cost was 30,000 francs. Gunpowder cost three bags to the livre; hence, 60,000 bags cost a total of 20,000 francs. Another 40,000 livres was spent on shot, shovels, entrenching utensils and other tools and to raise 1,000 pioneers, who were to be paid in advance for two months service.³⁴

Not only was the cost of raising the army monumental, but also its day to day supply required vast sums. A basic diet of meat, bread and wine was eaten by the soldiers and officers, though officers' tables

were supplied with some other comforts, too. Fodder had to be carried along or bought en route by the army. In a land devastated by war, over which armies had marched and counter-marched, destroying everything in their path, the former was the more likely. Hence the daily expenses were:

Bread	98,400 loaves of one pound at one <u>sou</u> per pound =	5,120 <u>livres</u>
Meat	49,200 pounds at two <u>sous</u> per pound =	4,904 <u>livres</u>
Wine	319 <u>queues</u> at thirty <u>livres</u> apiece =	9,570 <u>livres</u>
Oats (Hay)	1,436 <u>raiseaux</u> at two <u>livres</u> per <u>resal</u> =	2,872 <u>livres</u>
Total daily expenses =		22,282 <u>livres</u>

Of this, 8,000 livres alone went to the officers' tables.³⁵

On top of this expense could be added wages for the soldiers and officers. One author has left behind "The Schedule of Daily Pay for the Soldiers in France", recorded on 29 September 1596:

- The first and chief colonel for his ordinary wages at 10 s., and 30 s. more for his diet and extraordinary charges. The second colonel at 10 s., with an augmentation of 10 s.
- The paymaster at 10 s.
To his clerks, 3 s. 4 d.
- The commissary for musters at 6 s. 8 d.
- In a band of 200 men:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Daily Pay</u>	<u>Weekly Imprest for Victuals.</u>
The Captain	8 s.	56 s.
The Lieutenant	4 s.	28 s.
The ensign	2 s.	14 s.

(Continued)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Daily Pay</u>	<u>Weekly Imprest for Victuals.</u>
The sergeants	2 s.	14 s.
Two drums	2 s.	14 s.
One chirurgeon	12 s.	84 s.
180 men, with 20 dead pays at 8 d. each man		3 s. 4 d.

- In a band of 150 men:

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Daily Pay</u>	<u>Weekly Imprest for Victuals.</u>
The captain hath	6 s.	42 s.
The lieutenant	3 s.	21 s.
The ensign	- s. 18 d.	10 s. 6 d. ³⁶

To continue with the example of the German army which marched to Henri's support in 1587, it was composed of 40,000 men, to which can be added approximately 1,920 officers, the daily amount devoted to wages (converted into livres) would be approximately 18,132 livres.³⁷

Difficult as this money was to obtain in a united country faced with foreign invasion, in a country torn by civil war the problem was almost insurmountable. "Taxes remained uncollected or were collected by an encircling enemy."³⁸ Moreover:

. . . The treasure, the sinews of all estates, straight dried up: for the channels whereby they used to runne, were broken with this violence, and the spring scattered abroad, some heere and some there.³⁹

Both common people and armies were often driven to drastic extremes to stay alive. Highway robbery, brigandage, murder all had a role. Even piracy was on the upsurge.⁴⁰ As late as 7 April and 8 May 1595 the sieur de Bellièvre wrote from Lyons to the king and to the sieur de Villeroy that the soldiers were forced to pillage for their pay; 174,000 écus had been spent and only 50,000 écus collected in revenues.

Constable Montmorency, famously conscientious in these matters, once even threatened to march away, leaving the Lyonnais virtually defenceless, due to a shortage of supplies.⁴¹ And the king himself wrote to the constable on one occasion to remind him of the need for uniformity in army administration--Henri believed he acted too generously toward his own soldiers in arranging to pay them, even making up past arrears, and asked the constable to consider the consequences if troops in one part of France received better treatment than those in another.⁴² Hence captured supplies were singularly welcome. When the king took Niort (1590), he found fourteen guns (the place held a gun foundry) and ten tons of gunpowder, as well as a sufficient supply of corn "to maintain an armie of twentie thousand men for the space of two years".⁴³ When Nages was taken by the comte de Montgomery (1586), he found fifty quintaux of wool and many furnishings, valuable for their market prices.⁴⁴

What hampered Protestant armies most was that they were always denied the resources available to the League. In November 1585, when the comte de Laval reinforced the Protestant town of Saint-Julien against attack by the duc de Mayenne, he gave each soldier a half pound of gunpowder and three matches--the total supply that he was able to afford.⁴⁵ In comparison, by the end of 1589 the League had accumulated much wealth: it had levied five separate taxes on the people and some special taxes on Paris; pillage, confiscations and ransoms had earned it a million in gold in Paris auctions; 300,000 écus were received from Spain and 50,000 écus from Rome; finally, personal contributions, when combined with the rest, gave the League vast resources of ready cash.⁴⁶

To achieve results, Henri de Navarre was compelled to sell portions of his private and royal domains. In Navarre he disposed of 200,000 écus worth of Royal Navarrese property;⁴⁷ in Normandy he sold 300,000 écus worth of land and the rentes for 6,000 livres.⁴⁸ Often he was kept afloat by personal contributions from his followers: Groulart and others had lent him a combined sum of 50,000 écus;⁴⁹ Sully made frequent mention of the thousands of livres he willingly gave to the king to continue the cause; and the baron d'Antraigues sold his woods at Mézilac and Cuzé which "have brought some thousands of pistoles" to help Henri's army.⁵⁰ Nor can the welcome subsidies sent by Elizabeth I and the Dutch be ignored. The king of Navarre even contracted foreign loans to pay his troops.

Due to the difficulties faced by the king of Navarre in finance, logistics and recruitment the war was largely tied to siegecraft and fortification. Sir Charles Oman maintained that sieges during the civil war were "frequent, but unimportant to a large degree" as the out-dated fortifications of towns rendered them easily conquered. Thus, he argued that their only contribution rested in their role as strongholds and bases for supply and recruitment.⁵¹ However, Oman underestimated their value for the Huguenots. A fortified town represented an anchor holding a section of their overall lines of defence in place, and because the opposing armies were not large and frequently were without artillery support, even a small, poorly-fortified place could present a major obstacle. Fortification and siegecraft had not at this time evolved into

the exact science which the great Vauban was to make of them a hundred years later; at this time, in the face of a determined garrison a siege could be long and wasteful to the enemy.

Fortified strongholds represented two more things to Henri de Navarre: territorial gains, a weapon to use at the Protestant synods where Huguenot chiefs grumbled over his leadership; and their ability to buy time. The king needed time to gather an army, supplies and money, and the barrier of Huguenot strongholds gave him this, Oman to the contrary.⁵² Indeed, contemporaries recognized this, one of them writing, "the war is conducted in this fashion [siegecraft], I cannot see that we will have so prompt an end to the Huguenots as the League promises".⁵³

The Huguenots were masters at uniting their towns in sectors for mutual defence, understanding that the security of individual towns and provinces depended upon combined support. When the duc de Joyeuse was attacking with a League army through upper Languedoc in 1585, the Protestant towns repaired their walls à l'Huguenotte,⁵⁴ created garrisons and nominated governors and captains of the guard.⁵⁵ In 1586, after the duke had taken and pillaged the town of Marvéjols, a general assembly for the area was called at Castres, where three issues were discussed: the appointment of an overall commander for the district; the fortification and supply of provincial magazines; and the provision of sufficient force to prevent the approach of the League army. The deputies left finally with promises for mutual aid if attacked.⁵⁶

Many strategically placed towns formed the pivot of local defences. Flavigny in Burgundy served as a rallying point, a stronghold

and recruitment centre for the Huguenots, and because it was spacious enough to house large numbers of troops, it was given a strong garrison.⁵⁷ Politique-held Dieppe proved to be a model of organized self-defence; a rich and strong city, its port was one of the best in Normandy and therefore provided a vital link with England. Its fortifications, representative of most in France, comprised two citadels, connected to a ring of medieval walls, interrupted by evenly spaced towers. The population was organized militarily into companies of bourgeois militia strengthened by a body of mercenary troops and some cavalry composed of Norman gentlemen and noble refugees forced off their estates by the war,⁵⁸ and the governor, Aymer de Chastes, had secured several neighbouring towns as a first line of defence for Dieppe.

Navarre's armies were, on the whole, conventional forces using conventional weapons and tactics, but they showed some differences in comparison to their Catholic counterparts. League armies remained "royalist" for most of the war in that they were formed largely of the old royal regiments serving King Henri III. These included the Gendarmerie and Compagnies d'ordonnance and other mounted troops. Also, provincial militias, royal bodyguards (such as the Cent Suisses), and vieilles bandes of old royal troops and the king's mercenaries formed the basis of League infantry strength. As a rule, the Catholics enjoyed larger numbers of infantry and fewer numbers of cavalry than the Huguenots,⁵⁹ but often this was not reflected in the field battles where Catholic cavalry normally represented between a quarter and a half total strength. Moreover, due

to the nature of the civil wars, the largest part of the infantry strength of both sides was tied to garrison duty, leaving much reduced numbers of men for active field duty.

At the beginning of the war, the Huguenot leaders lacked enough money to arm their infantry properly, especially with pikes, and because they lacked the support of the peasantry, their numbers of field infantry remained small. Consequently, until almost the end of the wars, nearly the whole of Henri's infantry force was made up of musketeers; by 1587 he had taught them to fire regular volleys, two ranks at a time, the front one kneeling.⁶⁰ After 1589, when Henri became king in France, he legally inherited the remnants of the royal regiments of Henri III's army, and for the first time the Protestant king had enough pikes at his disposal.⁶¹

The Protestants usually enjoyed an excellent cavalry arm, composed, for the most part, of the lesser Calvinist nobility in the kingdom. But although they were often better horsed than their Catholic counterparts, Catholic weaponry and armour remained superior.⁶² For this reason, Henri discarded the lance and taught his cavalry to form squadrons of six or seven ranks deep and to charge home with the sword, using pistols only in the ensuing mêlée.⁶³ In effect, this was the caracole formation--designed to achieve rolling volleys of pistol fire from ranks of cavalry--taken one step further. For the remainder, Henri kept large numbers of light cavalry on hand, who were generally armed with the arquebuse. There were two kinds: the chevaux-legèrs and the arquebusiers à cheval, or dragoons. The chevaux-legèrs were fast, efficient cavalry whose mobility

suited them to reconnaissance and surprise attacks, and who could fight on foot in an emergency, using either their muskets or pole weapons.⁶⁴ Dragoons also became a respected and efficient mounted infantry force in this period. Introduced to France in 1570 by Admiral Coligny⁶⁵ probably as an ad hoc solution to a shortage of cavalry, they remained a permanent feature of Huguenot armies and were used widely by Henri. The differences between the two types of light cavalry lay in equipment and training. The chevaux-legers were noblemen, trained as cavalry, but whose financial condition prevented them from obtaining the required weight and types of armament necessary to become heavy cavalry. Originally heavy infantry, the dragoons were trained to fight on horseback or foot with arquebuse, pistol or sword; hence, their skills in war were almost universal, though they were regarded contemptuously by their noble counterparts.

More than most contemporaries, Henri de Navarre made effective use of particular formations to achieve superiority in tactics or strategy, such as the enfants perdus or "forlorn hope". This was a group of thirty or forty musketeers placed in advance of the army, whose duty it was to disrupt enemy assaults. Henri was especially innovative when, in all of his battles, he interspersed these formations between his squadrons of cavalry; their effectiveness in shattering the initial force of the enemy charge is clearly proven by the speed with which the king's counter-charge put the enemy to flight. For this duty, they received an added eight livres per month in addition to their regular pay.⁶⁶

Henri de Navarre was one of the first army commanders to realize the value of artillery in the field; artillery always played a large role in his battles, and his guns were better served and positioned than the Catholic guns. At Coutras he had only two guns which performed marvels, and the same happened at Arques. At Ivry his artillery fired nine volleys with great effect before the Catholic batteries got off their first shots.⁶⁷ Yet, artillery was by no means standardized at this time, and thus, regularity in ammunition was impossible to achieve, which increased Henri's problems of supply even more.

The sixteenth century was a period of transition in warfare. It was then that commanders gathered the independent companies and bound them loosely together into regiments. It was then that governments began to realize the inadequacies of obsolete systems of recruitment and started the search for new methods. It was then that military theorists began to argue in favour of a national, professional army over the old mercenary forces, and that battlefield innovators came to realize the value of firepower. It was a period when, for the first time, the three arms in an army (infantry, cavalry, artillery) commonly worked together. Still, old ideas often clashed with the new, and individual commanders were free to choose either; but those who chose chivalry (or at least refused to change) were notably losing ground to modern military thought.

The Huguenots sought new developments through necessity, not through choice, but they found their strength by playing on the deficiencies in the armies of their day:

In olde tyme, the chiefe differences of warre were decided in the plaine field: where now they consist in surprises, assaults, and defence of houlds. Wherein the harquebuts and pikes are not only profitable but also necessarie.⁶⁸

These late civil wars saw three very important developments: the growing importance of a strong infantry arm formed of both musketeers and pikemen primarily for reasons of defence; the advantages to be gained by increasing the amount of firepower available to an army; and the new emphasis placed on surprise and defence rather than on costly decisions in the field--in a word, mobility.

The mid-century generation of commanders, especially François de La Noue, were awed by the destructive power of firearms:

. . . all these instruments are develish [pistols and arquebuses], invented in some mischievous shop to turn whole realmes and kingdoms into desolation, & replenish the graves with dead carcases. Howbeit mans malice hath made them so necessarie that they cannot be spared.⁶⁹

The Spanish armies--models for the rest of Europe--relied more on firearms than any other nation, but their formations characteristically consisted of double the number of pikemen to musketeers. La Noue, among others, wished to reverse this trend, saying that "the experience of many warres have taught that it is not possible to prosecute them well without a good number of footmen" who were armed with arquebuses.⁷⁰ Despite this idea, the pike was necessary still to stiffen the stand of musketeers against cavalry assault while reloading. The Huguenot infantry arm reflected this preponderance of musketeers over pikemen, forced upon them by their shortage of pikes, and they used this condition to their advantage. But due probably to the shortage of manpower for infantry,

and the inability to arm what infantry existed with a sufficient number of pikes, Henri's foot soldiers were husbanded carefully and played an active role in only one battle.

A proper tactical formation for cavalry remained unsolved until Henri trained this arm anew. The principles of cavalry--shock and mobility--continued to be the bases on which formations were modeled. Some preferred the Reiter-style horseman with pistols and others the lancer.⁷¹ There were advantages to both, yet the problem was to try to wed them to create a formation which would combine the strengths of the lancer and Reiter but not their weaknesses.

Cavalry in this period, particularly in France, continued to fight en hays, that is in a tactical formation composed of two very long ranks placed in front of the army and flanked by the infantry. Its inherent weaknesses included rigidity (the ranks were easily broken), unwieldiness and the difficulties involved in trying to command such a widely spread body of horsemen. Traditionally noble, it was a formation devoted to the use of the lance. Useful against disorganized feudal levies, its weaknesses were trebbled in the face of well-commanded bodies of musketeers and pikemen or the tighter, more manageable Reiter formation. To the proud noble mind, obsolescence was not a reason to change, and La Noue believed that the formation was retained simply on the basis of noble pride:

I doe also support that they chose this order, because the same horsemen consisted onely of Gentrye, so as everie man might fight in front, and never continue in the last ranke, everie one esteeming himselfe to be in valour no less then his companion. . . .⁷²

Henri de Navarre looked to the compact Reiter formation for the answer to his dilemma. "Five or seaven ranks of horsemen joyned together overthrow one alone", adding a strength and depth to the formation unattainable by the lancers:

Our men of armes have in our civil warres well perused the forces of the Reiters squadrons: for notwithstanding they always gave the onset couragiously, yet could they [the enemy] breake them, for they are so thicke that there is no meanes to get through them.⁷³

Sir Roger Williams cautioned against the use of the caracole tactic in battle, however, which might have been the outcome of the new formation. He pointed to the pistoleers' habit of discharging their weapons too far from the enemy to be effective and never closing with them for the mêlée; he showed that the flanks of the deeper formation were seriously unprotected against lancer attack and he noted the lancer attack with its initial shock value on closing with the enemy over the less effective caracole; he added that most officers and men, being armoured, were protected against long-range pistol shots; finally, he underlined that the incidence of misfire was great among pistoleers, while the cavalry pistol itself was so heavy that it made a man's hand shake badly enough that attempts to aim were hopeless. "True it is, being pickt and chosen, the pistolers murther more . . . but I was often in their companie when they ranne away, three from one Launtier [lancer] both in great troops and small. . . ." ⁷⁴

Henri de Navarre was able to reconcile the two schools of thought into a flexible formation whose depth added strength and weight and whose

methods provided speed and mobility. He combined the shock value of the lancer (using the sword alone) with the strength of the Reiter formation. Thus trained, Henri's cavalry was unbeatable. This, added to the customarily high ratio of cavalry in League armies and their ill-used, poorly-trained infantry possibly explains the reason why one Protestant cavalry charge, destroying its League counterpart, so often ended the battles with the Catholics utterly defeated.

The two opposing parties or armies--those of the League and of Navarre--practised two different types of warfare. Mayenne's army, by and large, continued the military practices of the middle ages. The Catholic cavalry, still formed largely if not completely from the nobility, continued to play the most important role on the battlefield and all else was subordinated to it. Infantry played merely a supportive role and often did not come into action if it influenced the battle at all. And the League artillery--although often plentiful--was so poorly handled as to reveal a complete and utter ignorance of its use in warfare. Positioned badly, furnished poorly and directed abysmally, in no major engagement in the last of the religious wars did it play an important part. Among the infantry, the mercenary troops occupied the pre-eminent position and, it appears, frequently outnumbered available French troops. Even the weaponry and dress of the Catholic armies harkened to an age since passed. Lances from which pennants fluttered and horsemen clothed in the colours of old family livery--sporting coats of arms on shields, brightly coloured sashes, polished, full-length armour and multi-coloured plumes recalled more Agincourt or Crécy than a battle in the age of gunpowder. If ever

the infantry assaulted, the Swiss or lansquenets pikemen led the attack as the chief offensive units among them, while musketeers huddled on the flanks or in the rear, generally badly led and very ineffective.

The League chiefs were content that mere weight of numbers, plus their ability to rely upon the king's purse and to field several armies at the same time was all that was needed to crush Henri de Navarre and his meagre forces. By contrast, Henri--through his deficiency in all aspects of war material--was forced to improvise and to seek new and more efficient tactics in battle and to build his army into a disciplined force with each arm playing a mutually supportive role. In this, he rapidly became an expert.

Finally, there was a dangerous lack of military experience in the Catholic ranks. It is true enough that the senior duc de Guise had distinguished himself earlier in his career and that most of the Catholic nobles had fought in the earlier wars, but few (apart from Guise) had command experience. Certainly Joyeuse was utterly incompetent, while Mayenne was mediocre at his best. The duc d'Aumale gained considerable success in Picardy at first but this was achieved only against a handful of Protestants separated from Henri de Navarre by many miles of hostile country. The only men of any real talent were the duc de Mercoeur, who refused to leave his province of Brittany, and the sieur de Villars whose sole interest was Rouen. In consequence, all too frequently charges and retreats were made without being ordered, and retreats turned into routs. Only the mercenary officers and commanders of the Spanish auxiliaries

knew their business and carried it out to the best of their abilities. Yet in the face of abandonment by a fleeing army, even they could not turn the tide of battle into victory for the League. It is little wonder why the prince of Parma grew frustrated with his League allies during his two invasions and marched back to Flanders in utter disgust of them.

Though in many ways Henri de Navarre suffered similar problems, he was served by a small, homogeneous corps fighting for its survival, while he alone had the necessary attributes to lead it--the royal title and the rights to legitimate succession. The numerous Protestant victories throughout the war proved what a small, yet resolute, well-led and disciplined army was capable of achieving against a larger, better equipped, but undisciplined and often poorly-led horde. Davila wrote of the Catholic army at Coutras that while it was beautifully equipped, it was "half in disorder, and all wavering, a manifest signe of want of experience". The Protestant army, on the other hand, showed nothing but iron and arms, "united and compacted in a firm perfect array, [who] showed their worth most clearly in souldier-like actions and behavior".⁷⁵ Still it is difficult to determine what was, in fact, Navarre's army. The very word "army" itself assumes careful organization through systems of command, supply, finance and troop formations. It assumes a professional force, guided by a permanent system of ranks and governed by strict rules of discipline. In many ways, Henri's "army" did not represent this at all. Rather the conditions that influenced the Huguenots, that forced them together into a semblance of an organized disciplined force, led by

competent leaders and held together by the strength of will of one man remain the important and decisive aspects of ultimate Huguenot victory.

FOOTNOTES

¹Antony Colynet, The True History of the Civil Warres of France, between the French King Henry the 4. and the Leaguers. Gathered from the yere of our Lord 1585. until this present October. 1591. (London: 1591), p. 169.

²George Gush, Renaissance Armies 1480-1650 (Cambridge: 1975), p. 24.

³Great Britain, Public Record Office, Calendar of State Papers: Foreign, of the Reign of Elizabeth I, 1585-1591, Sophie Crawford Lomas, ed., 6 vols. (London: 1921), vol. XX, p. 254. 30 December 1585. (Hereafter referred to as C. S. P. For.).

⁴Robert Held, The Age of Firearms (Northfield, Illinois: 1957), p. 37; see also, Gush, p. 68. The name lansquenet was derived from two possible sources: Lanz-knecht meaning "lance servant", or Lands-knecht meaning "servant of the country".

⁵Quoted in Gush, p. 72. Reiter means "rider" or cavalryman. The French called them Diabls Noirs (Black Devils).

⁶Jacques Gaches, Mémoires sur les guerres de religion à Castres et dans le Languedoc (1555-1610) et suite des mémoires (1610-1612), Charles Pradel, ed. (Geneva: 1970), p. 421.

⁷Charles de Valois, duc d'Angoulême, Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, eds., Nouvelle collection des mémoires relatifs à l'histoire de France, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), pp. 83-84.

⁸Michel Hurault, sieur de Veul, "An Excellent Discourse upon the now present estate of France", E. Aggas, trans. (London: 1591), p. 34.

⁹Auguste Poirson, Histoire du règne de Henri IV, 4 vols. (Paris: 1865), vol. I, p. 259.

¹⁰Agrippa d'Aubigné, Histoire Universelle, 10 vols. (Paris: 1886-1899), vol. V, pp. 352-353.

¹¹Ronald S. Love, "French Army Reform: 1624-1642" (Honours Thesis, University of Alberta, Edmonton: 1977), pp. 57-58.

¹²Gaches, p. 312.

¹³Love, pp. 59-60.

¹⁴Henri de Navarre to Philippe Duplessis-Mornay, 24 August 1589, in Henri IV, Recueil des Lettres missives, 9 vols. (Paris: 1843-1876), vol. III, p. 23. (Hereafter referred to as L. M.).

¹⁵Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), p. 51.

¹⁶Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de Tavannes, Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), p. 476.

¹⁷François de Bourbon, duc de Montpensier, "Advise, Given by a Catholike Gentleman, to the Nobilitie & Commons of France", J. Eliote, trans. (London: 1589), p. 33.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁹5 September 1590, L. M., vol. III, p. 247. The letter describes the prince of Parma's first advance to the relief of Paris, which forced Henri to withdraw.

²⁰Poirson, vol. I, p. 301. This was especially important in 1591 just before the siege of Rouen. On 29 September Turenne arrived with 14,000 German mercenaries; Henri also received 6,000 English and 6,000 Swiss. The remnants of the old French regiments gave him another 4,000 men. This formed an army of about 30,000 men, the majority of whom were Protestant regulars on "salary" and paid mercenaries.

²¹Quoted in Jean de Serres, Generall Historie of France, to 1598, E. Grimeston, trans. (London: 1611), vol. III, p. 897. Serres estimated that the king had 6,000 cavalry and 18,000 infantry, with another 4,000 French gentlemen serving on horseback. This was one of the rare occasions when Navarre's army exceeded 10,000 men, although this estimate was undoubtedly exaggerated.

²²François de La Noue, The politicke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de La Noue, E. Aggas, trans. (London: 1587), p. 188. The non-noble officer was called a roturier.

²³Charles LaCretelle, Histoire de France pendant les Guerres de Religion, 4 vols. (Paris: 1844), vol. III, p. 213.

²⁴Claude Groulart, Voyages en Court, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), p. 538.

²⁵Gaches, p. 395.

²⁶Bishop Hardouin de Beaumont de Péréfixe, Henry the Great, J. D. (?), trans. (London: 1661); reprinted in Courtiers and Favourites of Royalty, Leao Vallée, ed. (New York: 1903), p. 96.

²⁷Maximilien de Bethune, duc de Sully, Mémoires des sages et royales oeconomies d'Etat, domestiques, politiques, militaires de Henri le Grand, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vols. XVI and XVII [Paris: 1854], vol. XVI, p. 47. (Hereafter referred to as Sully, (M. & P.).]

²⁸Ibid., p. 70. ". . . [I] was obliged to have recourse to a pair of pistols loaded with steel balls, against which no arms are proof."

²⁹Jacques Pape, seigneur de Saint-Auban, Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), p. 499. On the average, Henri's cavalry was armed with a cuirass, morion helmet, sword and pistol, and his tactics reflected their use.

³⁰d'Aubigné, vol. VI, pp. 225-226.

³¹Angoulême, p. 76.

³²Colynet, p. 170.

³³"A discourse of all such Fights, Skirmishes, Exploites, and other politike attempts which have happened in France since the arivall of the Duke of Parma, and the joyning of his Forces with the Enemies" (London: 1590), p. 5.

³⁴Michel de La Huguerye, Mémoires inedités de Michel de La Huguerye, baron Alphonse de Ruble, ed., 4 vols. (Paris: 1878), vol. II, pp. 388-389. The weight of a bag of powder is unknown.

³⁵Ibid., vol. III, p. 79. By the calculations given in La Huguerye's schedule, it would appear that this amount paid for 49,200 officers and men. La Huguerye's editor explains the units of measure ibid., p. 79 ff.

³⁶G. B. Harrison, ed., An Elizabethan Journal, 1591-1594, 3 vols. (London: 1928), vol. III, p. 38. It is likely that the English troops were paid slightly more than their French counterparts, although the difference appears not to have been significant.

³⁷The écu (crown) was worth six shillings sterling. The livre (a third the value of the écu at this time) was worth two shillings sterling. A florin was the equivalent of one livre. One pound sterling during Elizabeth I's reign equalled sixty shillings. In the middle ages, in both France and England, a pound or livre represented a full pound's weight of pure silver. Debasement of coinage was much slower in England than in France. See, Henry M. Baird, The Huguenots and Henry of Navarre, 2 vols. (New York: 1903), vol. II, p. 184 ff.

³⁸Edmund Howard Dickerman, "The King's Men: The Ministers of Henry III and Henry IV, 1574-1610" (dissertation, 1965, Brown University, Ann Arbor, Michigan: 1967), vol. II, p. 97.

³⁹Hurault, "France, 1591", p. 10.

⁴⁰Pierre de L'Estoile, Journal de L'Estoile pour le règne de Henri III (1574-1589), Louis-Raymond Lefèvre, ed. (Paris: 1948), p. 460. L'Estoile recorded in December 1586: "At this time, young Lansac with six vessels seized and occupied the Garonne from Bordeaux to the Sea, and robbed everyone he encountered . . . indiscriminantly, Huguenots and Catholics alike, recognizing neither the king, nor the Guises nor the king of Navarre . . .".

⁴¹Dickerman, vol. II, p. 110.

⁴²7 May 1592, L. M., vol. III, pp. 629-633.

⁴³Colynet, p. 334. The cannons consisted of five thirteen-inch pieces, two "very long Culverins", two smaller culverins and five other small guns.

⁴⁴Gaches, p. 322. Montgomery also committed there some of the rarer incidents of atrocities of Protestant origin--he killed the garrison.

⁴⁵d'Aubigné, vol. VII, p. 9. See also C. S. P. For., "Advertisements from France", 1590, vol. XX, p. 65. During the siege of Brouage, there were "two hundred horse, gentlemen of Poitou who remain in their houses to spare the provisions, but would join the army as soon as there was need".

⁴⁶Colynet, p. 449.

⁴⁷Philippe du Plessis-Marley, sieur de Mornay, Mémoires et correspondance, 12 vols. (Paris: 1824-1825), vol. I, pp. 198, 202-203. It is perhaps for this reason that Henri did not join Navarre to the French domains in 1589, so that he could sell royal lands there for money which he could not do in France. See, Charlotte Arbaleste de Mornay, Mémoires de Madame de Mornay, Madame de Witt, ed., 2 vols. (Paris: 1868), vol. I, p. 188.

⁴⁸14 July, 3 September 1591, L. M., vol. III, pp. 437, 478.

⁴⁹Groulart, p. 556.

⁵⁰L. M., vol. II, p. 398. The pistole was a Spanish coin which, wrote Sully, was so numerous in northern France that commerce generally was carried out in that currency. [Sully, The Memoirs of the Duke of Sully, Prime Minister to Henry the Great, Mrs. Lennox, trans., Sir Walter Scott, ed., 4 vols. (London: 1856), vol. I, p. 354. (Hereafter referred to as Sully, Mémoires, (Scott).] For an explanation of the two sets of memoirs, please see the bibliography.

⁵¹Sir Charles Oman, A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (London: 1937), p. 409.

⁵²Certainly Henri's commanders shared this belief. After his check at Issurtille, the sieur de Tavannes fell back on Flavigny, while the duc de Nemours and sieur de Fervaques united their Catholic armies to defeat him. Leaving Flavigny well-supplied and under the good leadership of the sieur de Cherizy, he took to the countryside. He knew that while Flavigny could withstand a siege for some time, he could use that time to raise troops and march to the town's relief later. (Tavannes, p. 479.)

⁵³Étienne Pasquier to M. de Sainte-Marthe, Étienne Pasquier, Lettres Historiques pour les années 1556-1594, D. Thickett, ed. (Geneva: 1966), p. 266.

⁵⁴These were patched-up, antiquated walls quickly reinforced to be more formidable and to offer longer resistance. (Oman, p. 409.)

⁵⁵Gaches, p. 308.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 344-345. The sack of Marvéjols was one of the great atrocities of the war. Almost defenceless, the town surrendered practically without firing a shot. This did not stop Joyeuse from sacking, then burning the town and murdering most of the inhabitants. [Jean Philippi wrote that Joyeuse took Marvéjols in August 1587. (Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. VIII (Paris: 1854), p. 640.) Because Gaches was a resident of Castres, he is probably the more correct of the two.]

⁵⁷Tavannes, p. 477. The loyal parlement of Burgundy was moved from Dijon to Flavigny, which became the centre of Royalist activity until the surrender of Dijon later in the war.

⁵⁸Poirson, vol. I, pp. 63-64. The Dieppe garrison numbered approximately 6,000 men. Also, Arques was one of the outposts established for the greater defence of the city.

⁵⁹Gush, p. 58.

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 59.

⁶¹Oman, p. 466.

⁶²See pp. 10-11 for Huguenot armament.

⁶³Gush, pp. 58-59.

⁶⁴Angoulême, p. 84. At the battle of Arques, the chevaux-legèrs fought on foot, using halbards.

⁶⁵Oman, p. 464.

⁶⁶Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 85. Oman claimed their use "may have been in part due to the habitual lack of an adequate proportion of pikemen in the Huguenot regiments: there was a desire to utilize the over-plus of arquebusiers in some fashion. To leave them in line of battle of regiments, with each regiment sadly short of the necessary stiffening of pikes, was not a promising formation". (p. 465.) This is wrong. Henri

understood the value of firepower. Indeed, armies of the seventeenth century--well-armed with pikes--continued to use the forlorn hope. No "over-plus of arquebusiers" was required. Oman's supposition that regiments of musketeers in battle would not be a "promising formation" is unsupportable--it was never tried at this time. See also d'Aubigne, vol. VII, p. 26. He wrote that the forlorn hope could number as many as 200 men, though this was rare.

⁶⁷LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 369. For more on the role of Henri's guns in his three battles, see: Angoulême, pp. 70-75; Serres, vol. III, pp. 885-887, 890-893; Péréfixe, pp. 89-92, 100, 97-102; Colynet, pp. 415, 452-457; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, pp. 164, 192; Etienne Pasquier, pp. 452-455; Pierre Matthieu, The heroyk life of Henry the fourth, E. Grimeston, trans. (London: 1612), pp. 21-24; Élie Benoist, The History of the famous edict of Nantes (London: 1694), pp. 50, 70; Philippi, p. 640; Edmund Skory, An extract out of the historie of the French King Henry the fourth (London: 1610), pp. B, C; "A Discourse of all such Fights, Skirmishes, Exploites, and other politike attempts which have happened in France since the arivall of the Duke of Parma, and the joyning of his Forces with the Enemies" (London: 1590), p. 3.

⁶⁸La Noue, Discourses, p. 199. La Noue referred here to the Reiters' use of the pistol, who have "the honor of being the first ye brought the Pistols into use, which when a man can well handle I take to be very dangerous".

⁶⁹Ibid., p. 169.

⁷⁰La Noue, Discourses, p. 186.

⁷¹This was respectively François de La Noue and Sir Roger Williams. Williams was a fine soldier and theorist whose own writings are very worthwhile. He thought much like La Noue and quoted from his book extensively. The two men died within three years of each other.

⁷²Ibid., p. 187.

⁷³Sir Roger Williams, A Briefe Discourse of Warre (London: 1590), p. 38. See also Eugene Carrias, La Pensée Militaire Française (Paris: 1948), p. 93; Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire de la Nation Française, vol. VII, Histoire Militaire et Navale (Paris: 1925), p. 295.

⁷⁴Williams, p. 38.

⁷⁵Henrico Caterino Davila, History of the Civil Wars in France, William Aylesbury and Sir Charles Cotterell, trans. (London: 1647), p. 648.

CHAPTER II

NAVARRRE'S COMMANDERS

The religious issue in France had disintegrated into civil war in 1562 and had been fought intermittantly for a quarter century. During these struggles, individually ambitious noblemen, who hid behind the cause of religion, found the opportunity ripe for exploitation.¹ True enough, at the basis of the new friction between the Huguenot Party and the newly revived Catholic League was religion, but fundamentally it became a struggle between two great families--the Bourbons and the Guises--for possession of the throne and France. The monarchy accounted for very little in France in 1585 as there were really three governments which ruled the kingdom. Henri III sat in Paris as the rightful monarch and attempted to govern from the traditional capital; the duc de Guise and the League governed the wealthy north and northeast of France; and Henri de Navarre, with the aid of the duc de Montmorency-Damville, ruled in the south and southwest where lived the majority of French Calvinists.

The Huguenots were probably the strongest party internally, but the outward appearance of the party did not inspire confidence. The minority position of the party hampered its reputation as it was not widespread enough to attract greater support. United by religion and a common cause, the Protestants looked to Henri as their leader, "being kept in by the duetie of conscience, which doth unite them together, be it for religion sake, or that they finde themselves farre in, in a just

quarrell".² Due to deceiving appearances, most observers in France read the conditions incorrectly. The League thought the war would end within a few days. Its leaders reasoned that Henri de Navarre was "a poor Prince, without money and without credit", and assumed that the Dutch and English were too busy with the Spanish threat to come to Henri's aid.³ Yet the inherent strength of the party, found in its organization, unity of purpose, compact geographic position and strength of leadership, proved itself capable of sustaining heavy assault. Some contemporaries saw the hidden strength of the Huguenot Party clearly:

. . . our Huguenots and their adherents are stronger than one thinks, both within and without the kingdom. They would not have a lack of Catholics who will assist them . . .⁴

Above all, the strength of Navarre's party depended upon his capacities as a leader.

Like the League's chiefs, Navarre's leadership was based on family support, complete with wealth, lands, clients, feudal bonds and titles. So important was this support that it greatly influenced the war. Henri de Navarre was served by his cousin, the prince de Condé, and his three brothers (the prince de Conti, comte de Soissons and cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon), the duc de La Trémouille (Condé's father-in-law), the duc de Montpensier and his son, the prince de Dombes, all of whom, except Trémouille, were princes of the blood royal.⁵ Indeed the majority of generals in the Protestant high command came from Henri's own family of Bourbon. He felt he could trust these men more openly as their close bonds of kinship banded them together--despite religion--in a common cause.

In a word, they were as eager to see their family rise to the kingdom of France as was Henri de Navarre himself.

The party leadership until 1588 was divided among three men, Henri de Condé, Henri de Montmorency and Henri de Navarre himself. The prince de Condé was Henri's first cousin, a Protestant and the heir to the throne if Navarre died without children. The duc de Montmorency was the powerful governor in Languedoc who, though unrelated to the Bourbon house, had joined the king of Navarre by reason of his hatred for the League and distrust of Henri III. A Catholic, he was the most powerful politique noble who supported the Protestant king.

It is clear that Navarre recognized the prince de Condé as his partner in the leadership of the Protestant cause.⁶ Condé's relationship to the king and his position in the line of succession made this so, and his following was equal to Henri's. This problem soon led to difficulties between the two princes of the blood. Other groups just as clearly recognized Condé as Navarre's partner in leadership. It was not by accident that the prince was included in Sixtus V's bull of excommunication issued against the king of Navarre. Indeed, the two men shared the responsibilities of leadership in the party and worked toward victory. In July 1585, when the League was growing stronger and Henri III was trying to maintain peace:

About the same time the Prince of Condé understanding how things were like to passe betweene the King and the Leaguers, departed from Rochel to repayre to the King of Navarre, and leaveth the Lord Rohan in Poytow, to over looke and withstand the attempts of the Leaguers there.⁷

The prince de Condé was a good field commander, though not a brilliant one as he was prone to rashness and impulse. Nevertheless, backed by a determined army and able advisers, he was capable of achieving some excellent results--both in victory and in defeat.

The Prince of Condé's forces are very small, yet he has so well employed them as, having taken Royan upon the river of Garonne, Tonnay-Charente and Soubise upon the river of Charante, with thirteen other castles in Poitou, he has assured that country, and controls the traffic of those two rivers, bringing great profit into his coffers [customs duties, taxes, etc.].⁸

Condé had begun the war by besieging the important town of Brouage in Poitou. Had he maintained his siege without interruption, the Protestants might have gained a very handsome prize, useful as much for its strength as for its strategic position. However, when the prince learned that a small group of Protestant soldiers had captured the citadel of Angers-sur-Loire, he could not resist the temptation to reduce that city, making it a Protestant bridgehead deep within League territory. Taking all of his cavalry with him, Condé launched his campaign, leaving behind a much reduced army to try to hold the trenches around Brouage.

The assault was a daring and dangerous one, poorly organized and ill-supplied. Also, it was a plan that was far too ambitious for the still meagre Protestant forces. Before he arrived, the citadel of Angers had been recaptured, while five separate League forces closed in on the Huguenots from different directions. The one achievement gained by the Protestants came during the retreat. Condé preserved his army from destruction by dividing it into small parties of about twenty men apiece, sending them off to slip through the Catholic circle to find their own

way home. This left the League commanders utterly baffled, but the clever ruse was far outweighed when the siege of Brouage had to be lifted and leaderless Poitou and Saintonge were left dangerously stripped of men.

Doubtlesse too much courage and too little consideration (a dangerous oversight in any great commander) had engaged the Prince on this side the river of Loire, amongst many armies of enemies, having to bridge at his devotion, without boates to repasse [the Loire], or any hope of succour.⁹

The defeat cost Condé "much of his force and of his reputation". His forces were widely scattered and it was to be some time before they were collected together again, while he was compelled to remain an uninvited guest of Elizabeth I in England, where he had escaped during the retreat.¹⁰ It was three months before Condé returned to France.

The close cooperation between Condé and Navarre in 1585 rapidly deteriorated into a heated rivalry, at first concealed but later revealed to the entire party.¹¹ Condé's position in the line of succession, his personality and his following within the party prepared the rift which soon split the prince and Navarre. The rivalry between the two men was particularly publicized by the "disaster of Angers"--Henri had thought it was a foolish expedition, and was proved correct, but Condé completely ignored his advice.¹² "In the middle of all these difficulties, the attitude of Condé was not the least of Navarre's worries",¹³ but to dispel the rivalry between them, Henri tried to buy Condé's submission to him through a promise that the prince would fall heir to all of his possessions and would receive the hand of his sister, Catherine, in marriage.¹⁴ This

did not work. Instead, immediately upon his return to France from England, Condé rushed to his town of St.-Jean-d'Angely. There, he gathered his old lieutenants around him and had them swear allegiance to him before they launched a new campaign.¹⁵

Soon, two groups could readily be defined within the party itself. There were those who followed Navarre (like Philippe du Plessis-Mornay and the duc de Sully) and those who followed Condé (like the duc de La Trémouille, the comte de Soissons and the vicomte de Turenne). Each sought predominance within the party and the lion's share of command and influence.

Condé's creatures remained fiercely loyal to his person either through conviction or because they saw in him the best means to augment their condition. Michel de La Huguerye best represented the former. One of those who helped to raise the large German mercenary army for Henri's use in 1587, he wanted neither the duc de Bouillon nor the prince de Conti to command it; he wanted Condé instead.¹⁶ He also believed that the army leaders were being badly advised by Navarre's agents. La Huguerye claimed afterward that the army could have achieved great success: "If the jealousy of the king of Navarre had [only] let monsr. le prince, his cousin, go to command [the German army] there, we would then have seen great diligence and a wonderful fight".¹⁷ It is apparent that La Huguerye did not like Henri de Navarre, preferring Condé, and equally apparent that his jealousy of Henri's officers (whom he accused of cowardice) caused considerable friction.

The duc de La Trémouille best represented self-interest. The Huguenots in Poitou had been strengthened by the recent conversion of this nobleman,¹⁸ who sought in his turn to strengthen his own family through a marriage of his daughter to the prince de Condé;¹⁹ the duke then became one of the most vehement supporters of the prince.

Before the battle of Coutras (1587), Henri de Navarre spoke some fitting words to his officers and men. Then he turned to Condé in particular (and his brother the comte de Soissons), saying:

I shall say nothing else to you but that you are of the house of Bourbon; and if God live, I will show you that I am worthy to be the first-born of the family.²⁰

Condé answered, "And we will show you that you have good juniors".²¹ This was a scarcely veiled assertion of Henri's authority as overall party chief and a warning to Condé (and Soissons) to remember his place in both the party leadership and the line of succession. Undoubtedly Condé did not miss the hidden meaning of his royal cousin's words, while his own reply was a suitably careful response before such an important battle.

Despite Henri's attempts to assert his authority, the problems continued. The "jealousies, envies, and defiances which had little by little increased between the king of Navarre and M. le prince de Condé", and the latter's intentions and pretensions--encouraged by Trémouille and vicomte de Turenne--to absolute control in the provinces of Anjou, Poitou, Aunis, Saintonge and Angoumois as a private principality dramatically widened the rift in party leadership. Also, because he could rely on "troops who were devoted to them [Condé, Trémouille and Turenne]", he

could back his claims with force.²² Perhaps Henri might have been able to save the German mercenaries had Condé not separated his forces from the main army after the victory at Coutras and marched to try to carve out an independent sovereignty. His thoughtlessness contributed to the disaster at Auneau.

"Condé had vainly insisted to continue the operations [in the north after Coutras]; always under the empire of his personal preoccupations."²³ He wanted both to consolidate his position in the west and to march on Saumur, which move would have been of no help at all to the rambling German army. However, a lance wound received during the battle, resulting in a fever, eventually forced him to retire from the field. Therefore, he returned to St.-Jean-d'Angely in the opening days of 1588;²⁴ on 3 March he was struck down at midnight with profuse vomiting, took to his bed, then died suddenly two days later. The circumstances of his death were rather mysterious and no absolute cause has yet been found. It was widely suspected that his wife poisoned him, and an autopsy so concluded;²⁵ Charlotte was charged and condemned, but the execution of her sentence was prevented by her pregnancy, and several years later she was freed.²⁶

Condé had certainly been brave, "always the first to attack and the last to retreat",²⁷ and inflexibly Protestant, loyal to his faith and patriotic (in his way) to France. His contemporaries hailed him as generous to his followers and courageous in battle.²⁸ His loss was a serious blow as he had been, next to Henri de Navarre, the heart of the

Protestant cause. Though not as capable as his cousin in the field, he could fight an impressive battle. But he had been inflexible and outrageously independent and not a very good judge of men. By contrast Navarre was always willing to bend if it suited his or his party's needs;²⁹ and the Tuscan ambassador, Cavriana, once wrote, "It seemed to us that were he removed from beside the King of Navarre, it would be an easier task to come to an agreement".³⁰ Even the king of Navarre's own supporters realized the gravity of such an important death. Many openly acknowledged "that in truth this Prince sometimes brought [Henri] misfortunes, but . . . [his loss] could not be recovered".³¹

Henri de Navarre himself was shaken by the death of his rival.³² So moved was he that he rushed to St.-Jean-d'Angely to supervise the inquiry. Despite their competition, Condé had been as much a mainstay of the Huguenot Party as the king. Now, deprived of the prince's support, Henri was more exposed to assassination attempts by the League, who had only to dispatch him to end the war in favour of the League.³³ But Condé's sudden demise also may have come as a relief to Navarre. Aside from competition for leadership and rivalry for the affections of the Protestants, Condé's prejudices and sincere sympathy for the staunchly Protestant party members had taken him to extremes which were opposed to what the king of Navarre was trying to achieve. Where the king sought a reunited France, the prince had sought the establishment of a Protestant state within a state,³⁴ for the qualities which had governed him in war--courage, decision, dogmatism and discrimination--had guided him in politics as well.

Henri de Navarre still had to contend with Condé's three surviving brothers: François, prince de Conti; Charles, comte de Soissons; and Charles, cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon. Conti was a weak man, both physically and mentally, who did not pose a threat to the king. But his two younger brothers, Soissons and Vendôme-Bourbon, proved to be almost as troublesome as the late prince himself. With the passing of their father, Louis I de Condé (1569), these three brothers had been raised at court under the supervision of their uncle, the cardinal de Bourbon. Hence, they had been reared Catholics in contrast to their older brother, Condé, who had been raised a Protestant away from the court. The three had, therefore, broken relations with their Huguenot brother; but their cousin, the king of Navarre--unmoved by religious prejudice--maintained a healthy rapport with them, which helped to win them to his side.³⁵ Their life at court had not been a happy one: Henri III treated them with only slight consideration; they hated the duc de Guise; and they had been humiliated by the king's mignons (personal favourites). The League did not seek an alliance with the three brothers because the Guise faction was determined to rid the nation of the house of Bourbon. (It is true that the old cardinal de Bourbon was chosen as the League candidate for the succession, but it was known by all that the old churchman was feeble in health, unable to beget children and likely to die very shortly.³⁶) Thus, despite the jealousy that each harboured for their older brother, they joined the Protestant Party.

Soissons fled first, arriving in time to join Henri at the battle

of Coutras. Conti arrived after the fighting was over but was immediately sent to rendezvous with the German army to lead them to the Protestant king. Vendôme-Bourbon remained at the side of Henri III until the latter's death, when he joined his royal cousin. When the comte de Soissons joined Henri de Navarre at the Loire, the king found the count intelligent but ambitious and probably regarded him as a possible threat to his authority.³⁷ Soissons quickly ingratiated himself with Condé's group, remaining in it until the latter's demise in 1588. It is likely as well that many of Condé's followers considered him as a successor to his brother's position, but the count refused the honour as he saw the enhancement of his status tied to affairs immediately surrounding the king, Henri III. Hence, he resolved to leave the Huguenot Party in order to offer his services to the last Valois. Realizing the serious threat that this posed for his own plans if the count was able to ingratiate himself with the Valois court, Navarre sent the duc de Sully with him to report back on his every move.³⁸

The assassination of Henri III cut short the brief alliance with Soissons, and the count rejoined the Protestants through his hatred for the Guises.³⁹ Henri saw very clearly that the young Soissons held pretensions to fill the gap in the chain of command left vacant by the death of Condé. The king was once again faced with competition for leadership of the party and even, as he was still childless, for the crown itself. According to the duc d'Angoulême, the king engaged whole-heartedly in a campaign to maintain his authority within the party regardless of Soissons' and his followers' irritation:

The generosity of this great king was just able to survive his servants' pursuit of fortune or acquisition of glory in his absence; the person of M. le comte de Soissons gave him more rivalry than all the rest, of whom I have always known that he had such suspicion, that if the count made one step toward the enemy, he wanted to take two towards him.⁴⁰

To remove Soissons from the centre of affairs, and therefore from the opportunities to meddle in party concerns, Henri de Navarre sent him north in 1589 with forces under the duc de Longueville and François de La Noue into Picardy while he himself withdrew to the west and Dieppe, soon followed by a powerful League army under the duc de Mayenne. Henri tried to collect sufficient force before the battle at Arques by recalling various units, including that under Longueville and Soissons. But it was not until after the battle was fought and won that Soissons marched. Later, the duc de Sully wrote:

It was owing to the comte de Soissons that he [Henri] was so often in danger at Dieppe [i. e., why Henri did not receive sufficient reinforcements until after the battle of Arques], who amused himself with disputing about the commandment of the forces, instead of hastening to the king's assistance.⁴¹

After Arques, the king of Navarre marched to join the tardy army led by Soissons, Longueville and La Noue. The royal party reached their camp at Gamaches about the 23 September at sunset "where M. le comte de Soissons, on bended knee, recognized the King for his sovereign Lord, protesting to him an oath of his loyalty, with all the assurances of very humble obeissance and complete submission".⁴² Soissons could do nothing else in front of a freshly victorious king. Henri graciously accepted his homage, even climbing down from his horse to embrace him. The king could not afford to reveal openly the breach that had opened between them, or

acknowledge publicly that the rivalry existed.

Soissons harboured a desire to be married into Henri's immediate family and sought the hand of his sister; Catherine. During the siege of Rouen (1592) he stole away from the royal army to Béarn to accomplish this, without telling the king. "But he [Soissons] was one of those persons whose most inconsiderable actions were strictly observed by the king."⁴³ It is clear that the count's designs to marry Madame Catherine were "against the intentions of His Majesty",⁴⁴ for Henri sent orders ahead to his representatives in the province to prevent the count from achieving his goal. When stopped by the sieur de Pangeas (the chief of Henri's council in Béarn), the comte de Soissons retorted by pushing the councillor down a flight of stairs. Sully wrote of Soissons "that there never was a more blind or more boundless ambition . . . He himself knew not the object that his wishes aimed at; restless, uneasy, and jealous, his ambition was fed by everything and drew advantage from nothing . . . Pomp and the ostentation of grandeur were his taste: in a word, ambition had taken absolute possession of his heart, and his whole behavior was made up of ceremony and formality".⁴⁵

This explosive issue was the major cause of the very wide rift that had opened between the two men. In 1592, when Henri flatly refused to permit the marriage between his cousin and his sister, "he [Soissons] left the king of Navarre entirely, with unpleasant words on all sides, and with little hope of ever reconciling both spirits again". Sully added that "regardless of all my remonstrances and allegations, His Majesty said to me that the affair of madame his sister and of

M. le comte de Soissons was more important to him, than Rouen or all of Normandy".⁴⁶ In 1595 the count once more asked the king of Navarre for Catherine's hand, and when refused, he stormed away, breaking relations completely with his cousin.⁴⁷ Had Soissons commanded the same support which had so well served his brother, Condé, he might have done considerable damage to Navarre's position; but his late arrival to Henri's side in 1587 was suspicious, his defection to the party of Henri III in 1588 was cause for concern, and his overbearing manner created much animosity. Hence, Soissons fought a losing struggle against the king.

The prince de Conti became acting-head of the house of Condé, during the minority of the newly-born duke, with the death of the king's old rival. Therefore, Henri could count on Conti becoming the ineffective leader of the prince's partisans, despite physical infirmities and limited mental capacities. Because the prince de Conti was incapable of causing dissension in the party ranks, the king of Navarre used his services widely. He marched by Henri's side, he "led" the German army until its defeat at the disastrous battle of Auneau and he was given many titles simply because he was ideal in the role of figurehead or nominal commander. Thus it was that Conti was named Henri's lieutenant-general in Anjou, Touraine, Maine, Poitou, Berry, Vendômois, Dumois, "upper and lower" Limosin and Perche while Soissons gained nothing.⁴⁸ His mental incompetence had made him trustworthy as did his family connection.

The king of Navarre secured aid from the third cadet branch of the house of Bourbon, led by Henri, duc de Montpensier and his son, the

prince de Dombes. The duke and his son remained loyal to Henri de Navarre and to the succession of their common family, rarely causing the command problems which had plagued the king while Condé was alive or when Soissons tried to expand his horizons. As Bourbons, they were entitled to a place in the line of succession, and they contributed to the survival of their family with its rights to the throne. Navarre was therefore able to trust his cousins with independent commands. Montpensier began the war, operating at first in Poitou in 1585 until he became Henri's "governor" in Normandy in 1589. His son campaigned primarily in Brittany guided by the advice of a list of old warriors, including François de La Noue, Sir John Norris and Marshal d'Aumont. Although a Catholic, who became involved somewhat with the Catholic faction in the party trying to pressure the king into conversion, Montpensier served the king well in his military posts until his unexpected death on 15 June 1592 deprived Henri of his valuable support.

Ranking with Condé and with Navarre himself as a prominent figure and leader of factions was Henri, duc de Montmorency-Damville. The king of Navarre recognized him as co-leader in the pamphlet, "Protestation of the King of Navarre, on the Subject of the Entry of His Army into France", of 14 July 1587.⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the duke definitely occupied the third position in the chain of command, after Condé, and never challenged the king's authority or his right to overall leadership. Sincerely Catholic and fiercely patriotic, he was chief of the politiques, Catholics who had joined Navarre for reasons of state, and military commander in the southern and southeastern provinces of France--where he had an enormous

personal following. He had several reasons for throwing in his lot with Henri: his hatred for the duc de Joyeuse, Guise's determination to crush him if he did not join the League and his abandonment by Henri III left him no other choice. On 10 August 1585 the duke met with the king of Navarre at Castres, and on 19 August Henri wrote: "I have seen Montmorency and he is now joined and allied with me very closely."⁵⁰ They met later on the 24th at Castres to discuss plans for the cooperation of their forces in their mutual defence,⁵¹ and again in September at Pézenas. Montmorency overtly united himself with the Protestant cause when, in October, he published a justification of his actions.⁵² The alliance was a defensive-offensive agreement designed primarily to secure the duke's support on the Protestant right flank and to maintain him in his government of Languedoc.⁵³ With the outbreak of war, the defection of Montmorency gave a strategic advantage to the Huguenots and a tremendous blow to the king and the League, as he was the one man powerful enough to uphold particular interests in the Midi.⁵⁴

In 1584 an Englishman characterized the duke as "crafty and without any great assurance of truth in him; affected to the Duke of Savoy, and by consequence is thought to be so to Spain; a dissembled friend to the Protestant princes, but in heart very partial in his religion and assured to no party". This was not entirely fair to Montmorency, but he was ambitious and the rumours circulating about his relations with Savoy and Spain were not wholly without foundation. For these reasons, plus his religion, many Huguenots were suspicious of his loyalty to the party though eager to count him as a military ally, just as Montmorency was

suspicious of the Huguenots but eager for their aid.⁵⁵ Foreign observers clearly understood that if Montmorency joined one party or another, that alliance "would be strong enough to give the law to others".⁵⁶

In addition, Henri de Navarre recognized and appreciated Montmorency's military ability. In a letter to one of his ministers, the king wrote that, in the event the enemy marched against the general, Montmorency had been ordered to place his forces in their path, "for although he has not so large a force as the others, he is a good enough captain to be able, with what he has, to entertain them until I arrive".⁵⁷ Communications between the two men remained open and frequent and filled with the details and problems of various campaigns. Yet like all powerful servants of the Protestant king, Montmorency had to be rewarded. He desired the lands of Joyeuse to begin with, followed by a list of other "gifts". Realizing his need for the duke's support, Henri acquiesced to his request. Also at issue was the constabulary, a rank left vacant since the death of Anne de Montmorency. An extremely significant title, it brought its holder position, authority and extensive influence as it placed him in personal command of all the established royal forces in France. As early as 1589 Henri de Navarre had promised the title connétable to Montmorency,⁵⁸ and this was made official in April 1595 when the king's edict was registered with the parlement of Paris.⁵⁹ This elevation meant that the duke would be forced to join the king's side, leaving behind Languedoc, so it is possible that in addition to giving a reward for services rendered, Henri wished to keep his ambitious "cousin" under royal supervision away from his power base.

Henri de Navarre was served also by numerous other men whose family names were great, including the de Châtillons. The house of Châtillon, a cadet branch of the great house of Montmorency, had been extremely influential in France throughout the sixteenth century, and was united closely to French Calvinism. Indeed, until 1572, the Châtillons--under the leadership of Gaspard, Admiral Coligny--had guided the Protestant cause. As the son of the great admiral, François de Coligny-Châtillon wielded enormous influence within the party and was as fiercely loyal to Calvinism as his father had been. His uncle, the comte d'Andelot, remained united to the party (until he left it in 1590), bringing with him his four sons: the comte de Laval, and the sieurs de Rieux, de Sailly and de Tanlay. Thus, in 1585 the representation of this very important family remained strong.

Henri de Navarre grew to depend upon the young Coligny-Châtillon as a mainstay of his authority, though remaining skeptical of his submission due to his family name and position within the party. Hence, Châtillon was delegated much authority and was allowed to act on his own, yet always under the directions of the king of Navarre or the duc de Montmorency. He was a very intelligent young man whose fine military capacity promised a splendid career. In 1587 he was sent to join the German army then entering France and served with distinction, despite the defeat at Auneau. In fact, the Tuscan ambassador, Cavriana, wrote on 4 January 1588: "If Châtillon had been obeyed we should today have been mourning where we are triumphant";⁶⁰ and Étienne Pasquier wrote:

"To tell the truth, had the Reiters followed his advice and taken the road he pointed out to them, our affairs would not have turned out so well as they have done".⁶¹

For the most part, Châtillon operated in the Midi, although he was present at the king's side in the battles of Arques and Ivry, and in the second assault on Paris in 1590. At Chartres, in April 1591, he devised a new weapon--probably borrowed from the Romans--which consisted of a covered wooden bridge which protected attacking troops in their assaults.⁶² An excellent leader of men, he could also be innovative.

In 1591, shortly after the reduction of Chartres, the duke fell ill and returned to his estate of Châtillon, where he died unexpectedly of a fever. With the death of the duke, the representation of the Châtillons came to an end, for in 1586 his four cousins had perished in rapid succession from fever and fatigue, and in 1590 the comte d'Andelot had defected to the League.

Another young noble of good name and important connections who rose to prominence within the party, and later caused many problems, was Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne. His grandfather had been Anne de Montmorency, which united him as well to the house of Châtillon. He was a man of intelligence and ability, but his keen sense of independence and personal gain caused Henri de Navarre considerable difficulties. In 1585 Turenne was entrusted "to defend the Dordogne River [in the face of a League assault under Mayenne], where he acquired a great reputation, for prudence and courage".⁶³ In other words, Henri had chosen

him to defend the towns along both the Dordogne and Garonne rivers, between which the Turenne estates sat, which connected the Huguenots in Poitou and Saintonge with those in Gascony and Guyenne and kept the lines of communication open with Montmorency and the duc de Lesdiguières in Languedoc and the Dauphiné. Turenne proved to be an excellent organizer and a careful administrator, assembling information on garrison strengths, the state of munitions and supplies, the number of volunteers and the loyalties of the people, and he visited each town in turn on an inspection tour to see if the information was correct and to supervise supply and repair.⁶⁴ He may have been inspired to such care because he had learned that Mayenne intended to lay waste his personal estates, so he was defending his own lands and his source of wealth.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, Turenne organized the defence effectively. He commanded 1,500 French cavalry, 1,200 Reiters, 9,000 French infantry and 6,000 Swiss, all reasonably well equipped and supplied with artillery. Turenne took care to maintain 2,500 infantry in the field for emergencies, dividing the remaining troops among the various strongholds. He also kept 200 gentlemen cavalry with himself.⁶⁶

Turenne proved to be a troublemaker within the party leadership, who managed to obstruct Henri in several ways. Not only did Henri need to bribe him with a suitable reward to ensure his personal loyalty but also he needed him out of the middle of affairs, away from the centre of party control. Turenne's mission to England in 1590, to negotiate for increased aid from Elizabeth I, only temporarily removed the problem.

The newly vacant ducal seat of Bouillon presented Henri with the unique opportunity to achieve both things, and he arranged a marriage for him with Charlotte de la Marck, duchesse de Bouillon.⁶⁷ The small principality of Bouillon was an autonomous sovereignty, between the Meuse and Moselle rivers, under the traditional protection of France. Fortunately, the king did not have to worry about Turenne's loyalty to the party, feeling free to place him in an independant command. On 1 October 1591 Henri elevated Turenne to marshal of France, which also rendered him more suitable to espouse the duchesse de Bouillon.⁶⁸ With characteristic panache, he surprised and captured Stenay the night before his wedding.

Turenne was among those men who sought to profit from the general state of anarchy in the kingdom. Clearly he was eager for glory and a share in the spoils, and habitually harboured jealous thoughts of his colleagues. Like Condé, Turenne had made plans to carve out a little principality of his own, but he was even more ambitious than the prince had been. At Montauban in 1585 he "gave the first indications of that turbulent, false, and ambitious spirit which formed his character". He suggested:

To form the Calvinist part of France into a kind of republican state, under the protection of the Elector Palatine, and five or six lieutenants in his name were to be sent into the different provinces.⁶⁹

Such a move would have reduced Henri de Navarre and the other Bourbon princes of the blood to the rank of lieutenant under a foreign ruler. The suggestion was crushed at the synod, but was later resurrected by the ambitious vicount.⁷⁰ Later he wanted Limousin and the Perigord, and after

Coutras he followed Condé's lead and extricated himself and his forces ("which alone composed one-third of the army") and marched away.⁷¹ After his elevation through marriage to the principality of Bouillon, Turenne continued to plague the king. He refused to send Henri the mercenary troops he had been commissioned to raise; he kept the troops that Henri had sent him, contrary to the king's wishes; he even stopped corresponding with the king, so that Henri knew neither the condition of his troops nor the state of his defence. Finally Navarre had to send the duc de Sully to try to remedy this.⁷²

Henri was never able to solve this clash with Turenne. Instead, he was able only to remove it from the centre of affairs by elevating Turenne to a dukedom and banishing him to a border principality. Like Soissons, the vicount had no power base within the party from which to work, while his fantastic ideas and plans alienated the majority of Huguenots who saw their futures tied too closely to the king of Navarre to abandon the latter.

Among the staunch Huguenots were two men who, though of lesser birth, proved to be the most faithful and possibly the most helpful to the king throughout the war. Philippe du Plessis-Marly, sieur de Mornay (called Duplessis-Mornay) was a man of brilliance and prestige in Calvinist circles. Nicknamed "the Pope of the Huguenots", he shared with John Calvin and Theodore Beza international stature among European Calvinists and might have inherited the leadership after the deaths of the two older men. Motivated solely through religion and a strengthening sense of personal loyalty to Henri de Navarre, Duplessis-Mornay remained throughout the

struggle one of the most sturdy mainstays of the party. The second man was Maximillien de Béthune, baron de Rosny and later duc de Sully. A staunch Huguenot, his principal goal was first to serve his king faithfully and second to maintain Calvinism in France. A childhood playmate to Henri de Navarre, a survivor of the St. Bartholemew's Day Massacre, and ferociously loyal to the king, it is doubtful that he recognized any other master than Navarre. In later years he proved to be a brilliant administrator, becoming in effect premier ministre in France not long after the end of the civil war in 1595.

It is possible that Duplessis-Mornay suspected trouble from the Guises as early as 1584, when he removed his wife and family from Paris and lodged them in Protestant Montauban. Although he continued to stay in Paris to watch the turn of events for the Protestants, considering "the delicacy of human life and in particular the uncertainty of his own, subject to so many extraordinary dangers, in addition to the usual [risks], he wrote his will completely in his own hand" and had it registered with some lawyers.⁷³ Clearly, Duplessis-Mornay expected the worst.

With the outbreak of civil war in July 1585, Duplessis-Mornay became increasingly active. He looked after the reinforcement, defence and overall command of many Protestant strongholds in Guyenne and Gascony:

The Lord Plessis in the meane time laboured hard in the places where was most neede, and caused the victuals, as well for men as for horses, to be brought in out of the villages round about.⁷⁴

Indeed, Duplessis-Mornay took personal command of many places when they were subject to League assault. In 1588-1589, when La Ganache was besieged by the duc de Nevers, Duplessis-Mornay maintained a spirited defence

despite being hopelessly outnumbered and without sufficient supplies until he was compelled to surrender on 16 January--but not before receiving the full honours of war.⁷⁵ Shortly afterward, in the negotiations with Henri III for a Protestant and Royalist alliance, Duplessis-Mornay and his brother, Pierre de Mornay, sieur de Buhy, represented Henri de Navarre⁷⁶ and gained through a truce what Navarre had been unable to win in war--a bridgehead over the Loire. Saumur was placed "in the hands of the king of Navarre . . . [and] at the consent of the two Kings monsr. du Plessis was established in it to command there in the quality and estate of Lieutenant to the King".⁷⁷ At other times he represented Henri in peace negotiations with the sieur de Villeroy, who represented the duc de Mayenne, was sent by Henri to negotiate with his German allies to achieve increased subsidies and supplies, and served as ambassador extraordinaire to the English court to secure increased aid from Queen Elizabeth I in the face of Parma's second threat of invasion. On the latter mission, not only did he speak to Elizabeth, but also to the exiled king of Portugal, Don Antonio, who had been forced to leave his country when Philip II annexed it, obtaining further support from the English queen and 200,000 écus from the Portuguese king.⁷⁸ As Duplessis-Mornay was used so extensively by Henri de Navarre, a bond of trust and friendship blossomed between them, and shortly after the battle of Ivry (1590), the king installed him in his conseil d'État, a distinction of no small significance.⁷⁹

Duplessis-Mornay was also one of the most brilliant political pamphleteers of the period, in which capacity he was entrusted with

composing many of the king's addresses and political treatises published in France during the war. These were masterpieces of propaganda and persuasion--a major element in war--made more so by the man's command of expression and language. His words were forceful, his ideas were well-presented, his work was extremely logical. Nor was coded League correspondence safe, for Duplessis-Mornay also proved to be adept at deciphering captured letters.

Finally, one cannot forget that religion was his truest motivation. Pierre L'Estoile recorded that he was a staunch Calvinist, equally attached to the king and to his religion. When the king abjured, for reasons of state rather than of the heart or spirit, Duplessis-Mornay's pain was made unbearable by the seeming lack of religious conviction in Henri's choice. This caused a significant break in the relations between the two men, and their once close cooperation and friendship was irreparably damaged. Perhaps LaCretelle best summed up Duplessis-Mornay when he wrote that he was the man who had most authority and who gave the most counsel, whose advice was most sought by Henri de Navarre, and who--through his personal virtues--was widely respected. "He was at the same time the complete warrior, economic administrator, a sincere and profound politique."⁸⁰

The duc de Sully, on the other hand, was a less complicated figure, motivated almost solely by personal loyalty. His friendship and close relationship with the king grew throughout the war until he emerged after 1595 as perhaps the most singularly powerful individual in the

kingdom next to the king himself. At the end of 1584, when Henri de Navarre wrote to say that the time had come for his servants to join him, Sully left his estates immediately to go to the king, taking with him 48,000 francs which he had raised from the sale of some timber; and in 1586, while Henri sat before Bergerac "without troops, money or succours" and threatened by three Catholic armies, Sully contributed another 40,000 badly needed francs. Whenever Henri needed large sums of money, Sully stood ready to volunteer his family resources and over the war years lent the king a total sum between 100,000 and 120,000 francs, a debt which eventually was repaid later in the reign.

Sully proclaimed his undivided loyalty to Henri, saying if "you risk your life and fortune . . . I must follow honour and glory, to lose mine in your service; because, besides giving myself to you [in faithful service], I must count the length of my life, not in the great numbers of years, but in the quantity of services that I will perform for you. . . ." ⁸¹ Indeed, he was used almost as extensively by the king as was Duplessis-Mornay. He fought in most of Henri's greatest battles--proving to be both a capable field officer and a skilled military architect--served the king as an adviser, was sent to negotiate with Henri III and in 1594 brought the negotiations over Rouen to a successful conclusion. Henri said of Sully that "his temper is naturally fiery: however . . . he is a good man, and loves honour". ⁸² He could be ambitious and was deeply wounded when the king granted the governments of Mantes and Gisors, two places he coveted, to Catholics and Saumur to Duplessis-Mornay. Nevertheless, this did not

shake his confidence in, or his friendship with, the king.

Two other men who constituted firm foundations for Henri's support proved to be among the finest soldiers in Europe. François de Bonne, duc de Lesdiguières was the Protestant governor of the Dauphiné. A crusty old soldier who did not understand the meaning of the word "impossible", Lesdiguières was solely responsible for preserving the province from League machinations and Savoyard-Spanish assaults in a series of breath-taking campaigns. François de La Noue had spent the major portion of his adult life fighting for Protestantism both in France and the Dutch Netherlands. A gifted military theorist and highly talented field officer, his greatest work, The Political and Military Discourses, was written while he languished in a Spanish prison between 1580 and 1585.

Even more so than Languedoc (Montmorency's government), the Dauphiné was "a vital power base in France whose proximity to . . . Italy made its control vital. It served as either a formidable barrier to Spanish invasions or as a strong vantage ground when held by friends or enemies of the central government".⁸³ Lesdiguières possessed even fewer resources than the other commanders within the Protestant Party; nevertheless, with the small forces at his disposal, he fought a war of manoeuvre and harassment between 1585 and 1589. His efforts were largely ineffective against major targets like Grenoble, and he was forced to withdraw frequently for lack of resources, but he kept the Catholic forces busy.⁸⁴ In a series of stunning mountain campaigns, he managed to secure most of the province for the king. Later he was even able to penetrate neighbouring

Savoy, much to the embarrassment of its princely ruler.

Lesdiguières, with modest personal ambition, sought to gain only one thing from the king during the war--royal recognition that he was governor in the Dauphiné. When he finally took Grenoble 1 March 1591 his secretary, the sieur de Saint-Julien, asked for the government of the province for his master, but neither the marquis d'O nor Marshal Biron would countenance a Protestant as governor in such an important place. When Saint-Julien learned of the opposition, he observed: "Since your great caution has led you to refuse the city of Grenoble to my master, you will do well to deliberate also as to the means of taking it away from him." Henri, who was well disposed toward the duke, laughed and then gave him title to the province.⁸⁵

In 1585 François de La Noue was released by the Spanish in a prisoner exchange after five and a half years of captivity. He must have been highly valued by Henri de Navarre as part of the price of the exchange was "the bond of one hundred thousand crownes made by the King of Navarre on his goods in Flaunders, for the assurance of my promises, not to beare Armes against the King of Spayne in his countryes",⁸⁶ the more meaningful when it is realized that Henri soon lost his money. La Noue stood at the right hand of the king and frequently he was sent as the actual commander-in-chief of an army to "guide" the actions of less experienced, nominal commanders. Henri trusted the old man implicitly, possibly the only servant of the Protestant king who sought nothing in return for his services; and it is clear that he trusted La Noue as much as he did

Duplessis-Mornay or Sully. Unhappily, Henri lost his valuable advice and aid when he was killed in 1591, though his son, Odet, served the king loyally until the end of the wars.

With the assassination of Henri III, on 2 August 1589, the most important addition to Henri's support was Armand de Gontaud, Marshal Biron. An old soldier of considerable ability, he had been perhaps the chief military adviser to Henri III.⁸⁷ Henri IV admired Biron's ability and wrote that he was "one of the best captains in France".⁸⁸ As the chief member of the Catholics newly joined to the Royalist party, his political import in internal affairs was immense; when the king asked for advice, Biron had to be included among those who answered, and Henri could do nothing without first paying the marshal the compliment of asking for his opinion.⁸⁹

Nor could the marshal forget personal gain in his support of the legitimate monarch. "The Marshal Biron . . . [demanded] the Sovereignty of the County of Perigord, and the King who was willing to buy this Lord at any price whatsoever, consented. . . ."⁹⁰ And in 1590, when the old garde des sceaux, sieur de Montholon, delivered the seals to the new king of France, Henri was compelled to give the office to Biron.⁹¹ The marshal remained a thorn in the king's side, and Sully was bitterly opposed to him. He blamed the marshal for the success of the sieur de Villar's sortie from Rouen (1592), claiming the incident was due to the negligence of Biron.⁹² Certainly, he was chiefly responsible for the failure of Protestant-Royalist plans to meet Parma and take Paris earlier in 1590.⁹³ But Henri was unable

to accuse him "for fear of a dispute, and that he would not put underfoot some factions with the most malicious Catholics"--he was simply too powerful in the party to oppose.⁹⁴ One of the ringleaders responsible for the organization of opposition against the king in the party, Henri probably was relieved when, on 20 July 1592, Marshal Biron was killed before Épernay when a ball from a falconet carried away his head.

Marshal d'Aumont also was a man of considerable ability who had served Henri III faithfully and well. When the last Valois was assassinated, d'Aumont joined Henri de Navarre,⁹⁵ in return for which he pressed the new king unsuccessfully to give him the governments of both Burgundy and Champagne. D'Aumont could be as haughty as Biron and frequently was, for his authority within the Protestant-Royalist army provided him with a bargaining counter. In 1595 d'Aumont was fighting in Brittany and while besieging a town in November, a cannon ball shattered his arm, mortally wounding him. When Henri IV heard of his death, he cried, "Unlucky Brittany, you have already cost me La Noue! I lose in d'Aumont my best support, my right arm".⁹⁶ Despite his personal ambitions, he had given very valuable military service. Another of the Catholics who served Henri IV loyally and well was the Marshal Matignon; like d'Aumont, he joined the Protestant-Royalist Party after Henri III's assassination and operated in the Midi for the duration of the war.

The commander who caused Henri de Navarre the greatest amount of trouble during the later years of the war was the duc d'Épernon, who

along with Joyeuse, had been the most powerful of Henri III's mignons. Épernon remained loyal to the king and continued to serve him, especially after the last Valois engineered the deaths of the Guises. The duke was present when Henri III and Henri de Navarre met and united in March 1589, and again when the French king was assassinated. Épernon abandoned the Protestant king before the battle of Arques, slipping into the provinces to watch in armed neutrality, but Henri IV's victories at Arques (1589) and Ivry (1590) persuaded him to offer his services in May 1590.⁹⁷ Henri provided a commission and money, and in 1593 confirmed him as governor of Provence. However, Épernon soon seemed to be carving out a private kingdom and to be secretly negotiating both with the League and Philip II of Spain;⁹⁸ he relied on tacit support from Montmorency, with whom he was related through marriage, and he had such serious conflicts with his neighbouring commander, Lesdiguières, that fighting eventually broke out between the two men.⁹⁹ Épernon remained a thorn in Henri IV's side until, in February 1596, he accepted the governments of Angoumois and Limousin in exchange for Provence.¹⁰⁰ The duc d'Épernon is a difficult man to categorize, and even as frequent and vehement a critic of the king's associates as the duc de Sully was hesitant about him. Rather harshly he observed:

A constant disobedience to his superiors, an insolent behavior to his equals, and a cruel and insupportable conduct towards his inferiors, make up the most of his character.¹⁰¹

Yet Sully held a high opinion of his military qualities, for he benefitted Henri IV's cause a great deal through his victories over the League in Provence.¹⁰²

The duc d'Épernon's brother gave the new king more faithful service. In 1589 La Valette hesitated only briefly and then joined the Protestant-Royalist Party led by Henri de Navarre. La Valette served faithfully until his death in 1592. The sieur de Saint-Marc left a good character sketch of the man in his otherwise colourless memoirs:

There was great loss [felt] at the loss of this seigneur, because he was a man [who] believed in God, was a good servant to the King, sage, patient, liberal, a great giver of justice and who never permitted at all his soldiers too much freedom, who with a handful of men, if this can be said, had resisted the duke of Savoy.¹⁰³

The last of the important leaders who joined the Protestant-Royalist Party after 1589 was the duc de Nevers. Originally he had joined the League, because of his Catholic allegiance and because he saw it as a means to reform the government by ousting the mignons from responsible positions. But the militancy of the League and the ambitions of the Guises gradually alienated Nevers and his following, and he joined Henri III. When the Valois king was murdered in 1589 Nevers still distrusted Henri IV and he rejoined the League; but once more the duke became disillusioned with League designs, and in 1590 he joined the Bourbon king.¹⁰⁴ From that date onward, he was to serve Henri IV honourably. In fact, when the king finally converted to Catholicism in 1593-1594, it was the duke who was sent to Rome to ask for papal dispensation. He died at Nesle, in Picardy, on 22 October 1595, regretted because of his "valour, wisdom and good counsel".¹⁰⁵

Three things stand out remarkably clearly from all this confusion. First, there frequently existed a dichotomy between talent and loyalty.

Henri de Navarre made extensive use of his subordinates, but positions of command were granted primarily to those who could be trusted to follow the king's orders--hence his reliance on family members and staunch supporters to officer his armies, to maintain some kind of unity in command, to add weight to his leadership and to prevent overly-ambitious, independent actions by those who could destroy his plans in furthering their own ambitions. In the high command, merit, and therefore promotion, was measured by loyalty more than ability. This did not ensure military success, in fact this may have delayed it, but it did ensure the king's preeminent position within his party. Second, Henri had to continually concern himself with the various attempts to threaten his overall command; all of the great nobles had sufficient prestige within the party to collect individuals or groups of followers around them, and most were intelligent officers who were eager to capitalize on opportunities as they occurred--sometimes with success enough to frighten Henri. Finally, and most important, these men could never combine to form a much more serious threat: both Soissons and Turenne were far too interested in personal ambition to unite, while their different religions provided a further obstacle; and Épernon never would have joined with another, simply because his haughty nature refused association with inferiors. It was this disunity which allowed Henri de Navarre to maintain his personal command; he was able to manipulate, trick, compromise with and even force the others to bend to his will, while he was adept at playing one party off against another, or one individual against a colleague.

But it reduced his chances of swift military success and contributed to the length of the war considerably.

FOOTNOTES

¹Franklin C. Palm, Politics and Religion in Sixteenth Century France: A Study of the Career of Henry of Montmorency-Damville, Uncrowned King of the South (Boston: 1927), p. 157.

²Michel Hurault, sieur de Veul, "A Discourse upon the present state of France", E. Aggas, trans. (London: 1588), p. 15.

³Serres, vol. II, p. 833.

⁴sieur de Villeroy to the Bishop of Paris, 31 December 1585, quoted in Dickerman, vol. I, p. 140.

⁵With the exceptions of Henri de Navarre, Condé and Trémouille, all of the other princes were Catholic.

⁶Henri IV to Mlle. de Bourbon, March 1588, L. M., vol. II, p. 358.

⁷Colynet, p. 38.

⁸Richard Wagmore to Walsingham from La Rochelle, 10/20 April 1586, C. S. P. For., vol. XX, p. 536.

⁹Serres, vol. II, p. 885.

¹⁰l'Estoile, Henri III, p. 390.

¹¹Other nobles, notably the comte de Soissons and vicomte de Turenne, joined in the rivalry, seeking to elevate themselves into positions to which they had no right.

¹²d'Aubigné, vol. VI, pp. 275-276.

¹³H. E. P. L. d'Orléans, duc d'Aumale, Histoire des princes de Condé pendant les XVIe et XVIIe siècles, 4 vols. (Paris: 1885), p. 146.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 147.

¹⁵Colynet, p. 114.

¹⁶He claimed that the duc de Bouillon was too young and inexperienced (at twenty-five) and the prince de Conti incapable; when Conti was sent finally, he took the role of figurehead only, and denied good leadership and proper organization the German army was defeated badly later in the year.

¹⁷La Huguerye, vol. III, p. 129.

¹⁸P. F. Willert, Henry of Navarre and the Huguenots in France (London: 1909), p. 150.

¹⁹The prince married Charlotte de La Trémouille in 1586.

²⁰Quoted in Péréfixe, p. 41.

²¹Ibid.

²²Sully, (M. & P.), p. 64.

²³d'Aumale, vol. II, p. 178.

²⁴Ibid., p. 179.

²⁵Colynet, p. 213. The autopsy was performed by six doctors. See also, Davila, pp. 674-675.

²⁶d'Aumale, vol. II, p. 179.

²⁷L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 546.

²⁸Colynet, p. 212.

²⁹Baird, vol. II, p. 22.

³⁰Quoted, Ibid., p. 23.

³¹Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 167.

³²The king's letters to his former mistress, the comtesse de Grammont, between the 10th and 13 March 1588 prove this. In them he described in glorious detail Condé's death and the suspicious circumstances surrounding it. (L. M., vol. II, pp. 343-344, 345-347).

³³Péréfixe, p. 62.

³⁴d'Aumale, vol. II, p. 183.

³⁵Ibid., p. 161.

³⁶Edmund de L'allouette, "A Catholicke Apologie against the Libels, Declarations, Advices, and Consultations made, written and published by those of the League, perturbers of the quiet Estate of the Realme of France. Who are risen since the decease of the late Monsier, the Kings onely brother", E. Aggas, trans. (London: [1588 or 1589]), p. 26. The cardinal was given the name Charles X. He did not want the succession and backed his nephew, Navarre, instead. In fact, he remained a "prisoner" in a Protestant chateau during the war until his death in 1591.

³⁷d'Aumale, vol. II, p. 161.

³⁸Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 66. Henri had arranged it in such a way that it seemed that Sully had grown unhappy with him and desired to abandon the Huguenots to follow Soissons into the French king's service.

³⁹LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 331.

⁴⁰Angoulême, p. 84.

⁴¹Sully, Mémoires, (Scott), vol. I, p. 218. Disputes over command were not infrequent among the generals and princes of the blood, as shall be seen later.

⁴²Angoulême, p. 86.

⁴³Sully, Mémoires, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 101.

⁴⁴Groulart, p. 557.

⁴⁵Sully, Mémoires, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 102.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 101.

⁴⁷Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 297.

⁴⁸Sir Roger Williams, "Newes from Sir Roger Williams" (London: 1591), p. 4.

⁴⁹L. M., vol. II, pp. 294-297. This was a pamphlet written in defence of his taking up arms and fielding soldiers against the attacks of the League. See also Serres, vol. II, p. 833.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 119. See also Colynet, p. 29.

⁵¹Gaches, p. 304.

⁵²Philippi, p. 640. For the text of his pamphlet, see Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. III, pp. 186-196. His pamphlet condemned the League for its machinations and deplorable treatment of Henri III, called for protection of the edicts of 1577 and held the authors of the "pretended" revocation to be enemies of public tranquility.

⁵³Gaches, p. 294.

⁵⁴Palm, p. 167.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 165.

⁵⁶Mucius to Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador, 1 October 1585, quoted in Baird, vol. I, p. 362.

⁵⁷Henri IV to sieur de Bellièvre, 4 August 1594, L. M., vol. IX, p. 404.

⁵⁸Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 189.

⁵⁹Gaches, p. 454.

⁶⁰Quoted in Baird, vol. II, p. 5.

⁶¹Étienne Pasquier, Oeuvres Choiesies, 2 vols., Leon Geugère, ed. (Geneva: 1968), vol. II, p. 303. Pasquier to M. de Sainte-Marthe, 1587 or 1588. See also Michel Hurault, sieur de Veul, "Antisixtus. An Oration of Sixtus the fift upon the death of the late French King, Henrie the third", A. P. (?), trans. (London: 1590), p. 24.

⁶²L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 105.

⁶³Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 159. Mme. de Mornay mistakingly places this in 1586.

⁶⁴Turenne, p. 52.

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 52-53.

⁶⁷Colynet, p. 196. Her two brothers, the duc de Bouillon and the comte de La Marck, died at the end of 1587 after the retreat of the German army.

⁶⁸L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 431; Péréfixe, p. 129. After her brothers' deaths, Charlotte received the estates on the conditions that: 1) she alter nothing within them, particularly religion; 2) he would not marry without Henri de Navarre's advice; 3) if she died without heirs, the estate would go to Montpensier and his heirs. (Colynet, pp. 195-196.) The marriage clause was especially important--she had been eagerly sought in marriage by the duc de Lorraine for his son, the marquis du Ponts, even though she was Protestant and he was Catholic. (Péréfixe, p. 130.)

⁶⁹Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 64.

⁷⁰Ibid. Sully added that "this was not the only time that the King of Navarre found secret enemies in his councils, amongst his dependents, and in appearance most zealous servants, even amongst his friends and relations".

⁷¹Ibid. These counties were very close to the vicount's own estates.

⁷²Ibid., p. 162.

⁷³Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 154.

⁷⁴Colynet, p. 323.

⁷⁵Ibid., pp. 336-342. See also Serres, vol. II, p. 869; Baird, vol. II, p. 118; Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 67.

⁷⁶Serres, vol. II, p. 875; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, pp. 174-175.

⁷⁷Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, pp. 175-176; Serres, vol. II, p. 875; Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 68. Saumur was to be a stronghold of pivotal importance to Henri: it was a foothold and crossing-point on the Loire and an excellent supply depot. He placed Duplessis-Mornay in command because he was an officer whom he could trust implicitly to hold the place for the crown.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 201, 211, 212-213.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 192.

⁸⁰LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 185.

⁸¹Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 50.

⁸²Ibid., pp. 82-83.

⁸³Palm, p. 194.

⁸⁴Antoine Du Puget, sieur de Saint-Marc, Mémoires, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. XI (Paris: 1854), p. 730.

⁸⁵d'Aubigné, vol. VIII, pp. 314-315. D'O and Biron both had their eyes on the province which was the real foundation for their disapproval.

⁸⁶François de La Noue, "The Declaration of the Lord de La Noue, upon his taking armes for the just defence of the Townes of Sedan and Jametz", A. M. (?), trans. (London: 1589), p. 5.

⁸⁷Henri III relied heavily on Biron, calling him "mon père", and the king wanted the marshal to begin the military education of the young duc d'Angoulême, his nephew. Angoulême considered this a great honour. (Angoulême, p. 64.)

⁸⁸L. M., vol. II, pp. 228-229.

⁸⁹Constantly through all the memoirs, apart from personal animosities expressed by various authors, whenever the king is reported to have asked his subordinates for advice--either collectively or individually--Biron is included each time in the list of advisers.

⁹⁰Élie Benoist, The History of the famous edict of Nantes, (London: 1694), p. 55.

⁹¹Groulart, p. 555. This may also have been done because Henri doubted Montholon's loyalty. The sieur had been one of those who had retired to his estates in armed neutrality in 1589, without immediately offering himself to Henri IV.

⁹²Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 96.

⁹³Colynet, p. 212; L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 72; Péréfixe, pp. 114-115; Benoist, p. 74.

⁹⁴L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 546.

⁹⁵D'Aumont had sympathies with Henri IV that he did not have with the League, while his involvement in the murders of the two Guises in 1588 made it impossible to join the latter.

⁹⁶Quoted in LaCretelle, vol. II, p. 67. The marshal was close to seventy years of age.

⁹⁷L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 48.

⁹⁸Serres, vol. III, pp. 915-916.

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 918. Lesdiguières strengthened his newly acquired position in Piedmont and then, with men, money and supplies, marched into Provence. The fighting broke out in April 1594.

¹⁰⁰Villeroy to Bellièvre, 27 February 1596, quoted in Dickerman, vol. II, pp. 128-129.

¹⁰¹Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, pp. 186-187.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 188.

¹⁰³St. Marc, p. 742. St. Marc's comparison of La Valette with his brother, Épernon, is an interesting one as well. (See p. 752.)

¹⁰⁴L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 54.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., p. 467.

CHAPTER III

NAVARRE AS SUPREME COMMANDER

If he hoped to lead effectively such a variegated collection of forces and officers, the first essential for Henri de Navarre was to demonstrate personal military abilities at least equal to those of the commanders whom he had to control and use for his purposes. Fortunately for the Huguenots, Henri proved to be highly skilled in the field and was more than a match for any of the League commanders. It is true that he probably was not a second Parma, although his manoeuvres with the prince reveal far more competence than later historians have been willing to concede. Henri was not brilliant; rather, he was inspired in warfare. This, added to his attention to detail, supply, discipline, the officer corps and army morale enhanced his skill even more.

Henri's leadership can be divided into three different categories: the personal, the political and the military. It is only by studying each individually that one may learn of the unique qualities wielded by the king of Navarre in keeping his army together and his officers receptive to his commands. The complex character of party affairs forced the king into such a position that he could neglect none of these aspects of his leadership in order to concentrate his efforts in a particular direction. The very nature of the party--particularly after 1589--forced him to be a general, a diplomat and a statesman at one and the same time in order to survive the constant challenges to his authority and to maintain his party strength.

Despite frequent trouble within the army and high command, Henri maintained a firm hand on his authority within the party and insisted that he be obeyed. He could withstand the criticism from his ambitious followers so long as it did not impede his progress, for he was interested in the results which could only be achieved with unity of effort. Henri's personal example was therefore extremely important, especially after 1589, as the Catholics in his party followed the man and not the Calvinist cause. Within the ranks, Henri was primarily interested in morale; within the officer corps, he was interested in loyalty. Hence, he took great care to ensure that everyone was looked after, even seeing to lodgings for the troops himself. He was always seen in the most dangerous places in action "to accelerate labours, animate his soldiers, sustain them in sallies, comfort the wounded, and cause money to be distributed amongst them". He closely watched army administration and repaired errors, reprimanding his officers for negligence or praising them for a job well-done.¹ More importantly, the king remained very approachable; he took the time to relax with his officers and men whenever he could as "he feared not at all to make himself familiar, because he was assured that the more men knew him the more they would esteem him".² Of course, Henri could ill-afford to remain aloof due to the poor state of his personal finances. Having only very limited means and six shirts to his name,³ Henri was frequently a self-invited guest of his officers or soldiers at mealtime.⁴ It goes without saying, then, that the king shared the discomforts of his men equally with them: "The dignity of Generall

dispens'd him not from the dangers of the common soldier"⁵ with whom "he suffred patiently, and under-went . . . [equal] perils, inconveniences, and labours. . . ." ⁶

Navarre achieved much through his considerable skill in judging men. His most trusted subordinates were hand-picked, while he knew that certain individuals in command positions needed to be watched. But Henri was able to use this skill to achieve the most from his followers. The night before Ivry (1590), Colonel Thisché demanded payment for the German and Swiss mercenaries in the Protestant-Royalist army. The king turned to him, saying: "How, Colonel Thisché: is this done like a man of honour, to demand money, when you ought to receive orders for battle?" The colonel retired, confused and humbled, and did not ask again. The next day, Henri was careful to assuage the colonel's feelings with the result that the unpaid mercenaries fought willingly.⁷

Henri's popularity was reinforced strongly by his personal bravery in action. Described as being "alwaies in person the first in ye onset and the last in the retreat"⁸ and a man who was "without fear to endanger himself and his life" to defend his cause,⁹ the king was praised highly by his contemporaries for his courage. Yet they criticized him as well for taking too many risks, endangering his person, which would have destroyed his party had he been killed. One biographer wrote that Henri's courage was "a bravery without doubt absolutely necessary for a conqueror, but which would be temerity and an unpardonable fault in a prince well established".¹⁰ This aspect of Henri has been a favourite

target for later historians who criticized the king for pursuing personal glory. Even Sully once blurted: "Haven't you acquired [enough] glory and honour in many battles already?"¹¹ Yet the king's answer was very revealing:

I cannot do otherwise, my friend, for since it is for my glory and my crown that I fight, my life and everything else ought to be of no consideration with me.¹²

He continued, pointing to the problems in the party, the differences in religion and goal and finally the need for high morale in the army:

. . . for all these reasons, therefore, I endure a thousand things which give me much trouble, and I thus daily endanger my life to maintain my reputation, resigning myself and my affairs to God, since it is much better that I should die with arms in my hands, than live to see my kingdom ruined, and myself forced to seek assistance in a foreign country [i. e. exile].¹³

In a word, he "knew that he owed his leadership of the Protestants less to his place in the succession than to his willingness to risk his life in the forefront of every skirmish . . . more like a common cavalry captain than a Prince".¹⁴ Only his personal example could keep the diverse members of his army together: the Catholics who followed the man; the Protestants who followed the cause but whose small numbers produced a need for inspiration to great heights; and the mercenaries who, if unpaid or unsuccessful, would abandon him.

Finally, Henri de Navarre was a compassionate man, many of whose decisions were coloured--some to the detriment of his overall plans--by what has mistakenly been taken as "faint-heartedness". For this he has been berated, especially where failure to achieve a given objective was

directly attributable to the king's reluctance to push his victory home. Although examples of his compassion are numerous, the sample of his siege of Paris in 1590 is the best. The city was blockaded and cut-off from supplies and communications by Henri's tight lines of circumvention and careful control of the Seine and Marne rivers. Very quickly the poorly supplied and inadequately defended capital was reduced to desperation, so that an assault in force probably would have broken all resistance. Yet, contrary to pressure from his generals, Henri refused to attack. Experience in 1589 had shown the danger of assault, when young Châtillon charged into the faubourgs at the head of his troops, shouting, "St. Bartholemew!".¹⁵ The king wanted to avoid the inevitable massacre and to prevent a sack which would have left the capital ruined and desolated. Moreover, the king had allowed between 7,000 and 10,000 starving Parisians to pass through his lines and made arrangements even to send some supplies into the city.¹⁶

The reaction to these decisions was immediate. He was criticized widely by his commanders and eventually received an angry letter from Queen Elizabeth I.¹⁷ But Henri declared a practical side to his decisions in his defence. He claimed first that the League authorities in Paris would happily have allowed the "useless mouths" to starve to death, preventing their return to the city once they had left it. Second, the refugees would have found a way through his lines with or without royal consent.¹⁸ Finally, he hoped that by continuing the siege the duc de Mayenne and the prince of Parma--already marching with a relief force--would be

forced to fight a decisive battle to relieve the city.¹⁹ Unhappily, the habitual problems within the army intervened and Henri lost the initiative--and Paris.

Politically, Henri de Navarre remained astute. Here he could not rely simply upon personal example as a military leader to achieve results. Rather, he was compelled to play a political game to maintain himself in his position as party leader and to try to promote sympathy for his fight and to attract further support. Much of his success was a result of his accurate reading of personalities and conditions as they then existed and his ability to manipulate these toward his own ends.

He maintained a relationship with King Henri III designed ultimately to attract the Valois monarch's support to the Huguenot Party. While the king lived, Henri de Navarre persisted in declaring his loyalty to the king of France and maintained a frequent and friendly correspondence with him, offering him help and advice against the League for the good of the state.²⁰ This was enhanced by many of Navarre's activities in the field. After Coutras in 1587, he did not try to follow up his victory by annihilating the enemy forces and marching to the Loire. This would have been a direct challenge to royal authority which would have forced the king more deeply into the Guise embrace. Instead, he offered the king the German army then penetrating Champagne for use against the League.²¹ Henri de Navarre sought the preservation of the royal authority and prerogatives attached to the French throne--a throne he wanted to inherit intact; hence, he saw his fortunes tied too closely to the French monarch

to destroy him militarily.²² Also, only by acknowledging the dignity and authority of the king could he attract the politiques to his ranks and show by personal example that no subject could legitimately defy his king. Navarre's policy finally produced results when Henri III joined him in 1589.²³ Similar tactics in persuasion helped Henri to attract many Catholic noblemen to his cause and to retain them after the assassination of the French king.²⁴ In the continuous correspondence he kept alive with the king of France's supporters, Navarre wrote in a friendly and open manner, always applying to them their proper titles, and reemphasizing that they fought a common struggle for the preservation of the state and dignity of the sovereign--be he Valois or Bourbon.

More importantly, Henri de Navarre recognized the need for an exemplary reputation as a military commander as distinct from that of his enemies. This was particularly evident in his treatment of towns and their citizens once conquered. He took great care not to sacrifice the respect and achievements gained from his victories by following them up with marked cruelty or irresponsibility. True enough, on occasion he had to allow his men to pillage a town--closely supervised, however--simply because he could not afford otherwise to pay them. But, in marked contrast to the League (and even to a few of his own commanders), the king of Navarre restored order and peacefulness to the people. He treated them with clemency, justice and wisdom, preventing the types of excesses committed by the League. The most important aspect of this treatment was that, as he advanced, in every newly conquered town he preserved Catholicism and

guaranteed its worship to the citizens, despite objections from his Huguenot officers.²⁵ This produced much admiration for the king's moderate policies. Wherever his influence spread or his forces marched, his reputation had preceded them with excellent results, while hostility toward the League increased. League excesses led one author to remark that that "was why the people said that they were much better treated by the enemy than by those of the duke [de Mayenne], in whose army there is no order, no military discipline, nor respect for religion even, though they call themselves Catholics. . . ." ²⁶

This culminated finally in the reduction of Paris in 1594. The citizens filled the streets to praise the king as he entered. By this time acceptably Catholic, his reputation ensured that the city would be well treated. Indeed, the king reinforced this by immediately pardoning everyone who had had League connections and who had rebelled against him.²⁷ The king later admitted to the comte de Cheverny that he found it hard to believe that he was in Paris and so easily.²⁸ Yet, this did not blind him to reality; when one of his lords commented on the joy of the people at seeing him, Henri answered that, "if my greatest enemy were in my place they would shout even louder", and promptly secured Paris with a garrison of 4,000 Royalist troops.²⁹

Henri IV's conversion was another calculated political move. Since 1584 and 1585 he had assured his followers that he never would convert, realizing the need he had for their support. In 1589 many were startled, therefore, when he agreed to receive instruction within six

months under Catholic pressure.³⁰ Yet he managed to stall for four years, using one pretext or another, without converting. Although many understood the need for the king's conversion to end the wars,³¹ Henri remained reluctant, until, in the summer of 1593, conditions in France and in his party threatened to explode. After considerable thought, Henri declared himself ready to receive instruction and soon converted. This ensured the loyalty of his Catholic subordinates, destroyed the Tiers Parti, undermined the League Estates in Paris and enticed many old Leaguers to abandon that party to join their king. Henri then hurriedly renewed the edicts of 1577, guaranteeing the protection of Calvinism in France and promised the Huguenots his continued support and leadership.³²

Finally, the king realized that many noblemen in both parties were motivated primarily by the pursuit of personal gain. The prime example being in 1594-1595 when "the faction of the Duke de Maine found itselfe weake, and succour failing, every one provided for himself",³³ although some powerful Leaguers continued to resist. With such an opportunity available, Henri IV eagerly took advantage of it--he preferred to buy back the country from the rebels rather than continuing the war and weakening the kingdom any more at a time when Spain threatened further invasions.³⁴ Furthermore, Henri lived by two maxims at this time: "that kings may always, when they please, reduce the most rebellious to their duty"; and, "that it is very dangerous to reduce great persons to despair".³⁵ Finally, he probably realized that, by rewarding rebellious nobles for returning to their duty, they would be

inseparably tied to the king's side, who alone could increase their honours and wealth. The policy worked as well for the king's own supporters throughout the civil war. Montmorency, Turenne, Épernon, Biron, d'Aumont and even Lesdiguières, among many others, were rewarded in this way for their services to the king.

Thus it was that the king consciously embarked upon a course of action that earned him some criticism from his own supporters, who were jealous of the titles and awards their old enemies received. Henri wrote to Sully on 8 March 1594, after one such criticism from him, saying:

. . . Do you no longer remember the advice you have so often given me . . . to divide by particular interests those who are joined against me? Such is my purpose now, for I greatly prefer that it cost me double to treat with each individual rather than arrive at the same result through dealing with a single chief, who might thus retain the leadership of his party in my state.³⁶

Henri undoubtedly derived some pleasure from the knowledge "that the écus of France work as well as the pistoles of Spain".³⁷

In terms of military leadership, Henri de Navarre was limited solely by the conditions extant in his army, high command and the war. Yet what he achieved despite these limitations was remarkable, mostly due to his personal understanding of the art of war and his quick intelligence. Henri was a soldier king in the truest sense, and his contemporaries understood his value as a general. He could be a gambler with a gambler's eye for success and high stakes, with speed in decision and a will to win. Although he avoided it wherever possible, the king was not afraid to take chances--he "never risked a dangerous action but when obliged to

do it by necessity",³⁸ while "the necessitie of his own defence did justifie his Armes. . . ." ³⁹ That Henri was self-confident is undeniable; that he was prudent and quick to gauge his advantages and strengths while quicker still to act on the disadvantages and weaknesses the enemy presented to him (whenever he was free to do so) is equally indisputable. Certainly his four great victories of Coutras, Arques, Ivry and Fontaine Française fit into this category.*

Yet Henri was motivated in his tactics and strategy primarily by the clearly defined boundaries of Huguenot means. Limitations in manpower and supply, problems in command and, finally, Protestant geographic concentration in the poorer southern provinces all combined to establish powerful obstacles to Henri's strategic plans. Yet the king was able to overcome much of this by personal diplomacy, his recognition of the party's limitations and his personal attention to detail in command and administration. For example, he made excellent use of his trustworthy subordinates in distant independent commands, granting them the freedom of action so long as objectives were achieved. Commanders who were less trustworthy he placed in sections of the Huguenot defence system where proximity to the king's own forces reminded them of the royal presence and allowed Henri to monitor their actions. The king also kept a list of the regiments and other units under his command at any one time in his pocket so that he knew always what forces he had available to him when

*See Appendix 'I.

dangerous situations arose.⁴⁰ His diplomatic touch gave him the equivalent of an added army. For example, Henri's continued good relations with Henri III finally won him a bridgehead on the Loire--something he was unable to achieve by force of arms. Even the king's reliance on cavalry and his preference for speed earned him praise when one author wrote: ". . . it seemed that his Canons and Regiments had wings, having marcht above a hundred and fifty leagues in lesse than two moneths."⁴¹

Tactically, Henri used any advantage that he possibly could, while creating some himself which earned him praise from foreigners. His use of the enfants perdus between his cavalry units, his reorganization of the cavalry formation, his reliance on the arquebusiers à cheval as a light cavalry force, and his recognition of the value of artillery, already discussed, illustrate some of the things the king developed for Huguenot use. His keen eye for any advantage presented by the terrain also contributed to his success in the struggle. At Arques, for example, he made extensive use of de Chastes' defensive organization, employing the existing river barrier to prevent Mayenne from cutting his line in half; then, he concentrated men in the narrow defile at Arques, fortified his front in depth and established guns and men in the old castle which overlooked the battlefield. Mayenne prodded ineffectively at Dieppe and along Henri's river bastion until he was forced to commit his attack to Arques. Due to the skill in Henri's choice of position, any initial advantage the duke held in manpower was lost as he tried to push 30,000 men through the narrow gap. Eventually, the League army was defeated and it marched away.⁴²

Ivry gave another indication of Henri's tactical skill. Henri knew that if he besieged Dreux, Mayenne would be forced to relieve it. At the duke's approach, Henri abandoned the siege, drew his men into battlefield deployment and moved closer to the Catholic army. When night fell, his men were ordered to sleep in formation, which gave him a significant advantage in time and preparedness and established a rallying point for his troops in the event of disorder. The day of the battle, Henri altered his line a little so as to achieve the advantage both of sun and wind. Also, his well-laid plans had assured him of timely reinforcement just before the battle began. The day ended in an outstanding victory for the king.⁴³

What all of Henri's battles reveal, however, is his willingness to take calculated risks. In fact, all of his battles were gambles which, had one been lost, would have ended the war in favour of the League. Henri was able to gauge, though, that the time was right for battle. At Coutras, he was desperately afraid that Joyeuse would not attack, leaving him trapped between two armies;⁴⁴ at Arques, he needed a great victory to reinforce shaken confidence in his leadership and to attach Henri III's old servants firmly to his party;⁴⁵ at Ivry (which Étienne Pasquier called "a miracle"), Henri needed to destroy League military strength once and for all, and he recognized that the conditions in his army--ever fluctuating--were ideal for such a gamble.⁴⁶ At Fontaine Française (1595) Henri needed to stop the last great assault by a combined League-Spanish army led by Mayenne.⁴⁷

In strategical terms, Henri was as capable as his enemies were incompetent. From the war's outset, he realized that the Huguenot Party had neither the strength nor influence to win the war simply on terms of brute force or even strategically by an immediate assault on Paris. Instead, Henri organized the Huguenot defence around fortifications and small field armies which could reinforce threatened areas, harass enemy movements, blockade major enemy strongholds or unite to fight the enemy in a pitched battle. Between 1585 and 1592 he relied on stout walls to break the enemy onslaught and small, mobile forces that could take advantage of opportunities to ruin League plans. Often Henri did not attack, judging correctly that the natural forces of disease and desertion--always at work--would effectively damage an army suffering from poor leadership, without his interference. In a word, Henri practised Fabian strategy,⁴⁸ best illustrated by Sully's quotation of one of Henri's maxims: ". . . to attack a party when the whole army is near, seldom succeeded."⁴⁹ As observed previously, some Catholics saw that the League would not soon defeat the Huguenots.⁵⁰

Henri's skill is perhaps best illustrated by his encirclement of Parma at Yvetot in 1592. Forced to abandon the siege of Rouen when his attempts at stopping the combined League-Spanish relief army failed, Henri was forced to retire before it, reinforcing various Protestant strongholds along the way. As was so often done in the past, the king permitted his army to break up, but the various units were ordered to stay near enough to the area to be recalled quickly and a rendezvous was established at

Pont'de-C  . The result was that the enemy, no longer fearing Huguenot activity, grew bold and stretched their forces across a broad front, reaching Rouen to the west and Yvetot to the east. Seizing the initiative, Henri recalled his troops, blocked the enemy lines of communication and supply and struck Parma's forces at various points. Taken utterly by surprise, the surviving League and Spanish troops barricaded themselves in small towns and in fortified camps and waited. Henri used the time made available by Spanish inactivity to gather more troops, close the circle and plan a major assault on Parma's camp at Yvetot, where the supply situation was becoming desperate. Only the forethought of Parma and the efficiency of the Spanish veterans saved the army, as they unexpectedly crossed the Seine River on a pontoon bridge--brought along for emergencies--only hours before Henri's final assault was scheduled to begin.⁵¹

The prince of Parma was a professional who was unwilling to take chances. His care to achieve a preponderance in men and material before a campaign, to fight only if it suited his needs and to avoid over-extending himself unless absolutely necessary or unless he felt confident enough to do so assured his success and carved for him a place in the ranks of the most successful and thus "great" generals. But apart from his genuine ability he possessed two great advantages that the French king never could achieve--the highly professional Spanish veterans and the vast wealth and power of Spain. Therein lie the decisive factors in his success. With such forces at his disposal, it is small wonder that he appears greater than Henri in a comparison that too easily neglects the serious limitations placed on the latter.

But effective leadership of the Protestant-Royalist forces required more than just military ability. The high command of the Protestant Party was often politically unstable; Henri de Navarre's personal relations with the leaders of the Huguenot and politique factions were frequently shaken, and relations between the leaders were repeatedly strained to critical lengths--with serious implications for military collaboration. Then, as the war began, it became abundantly clear that the high command was seriously divided within itself. The prince de Condé and vicomte de Turenne were obsessed with their own diverse pretensions; the duc de Montmorency pursued absolute control in Languedoc; and the important Huguenot centres of La Rochelle, Nîmes and Montauban nurtured republican thoughts.⁵²

There were many too who sought to better their positions by capitalizing on the war, and the king was frequently badly advised by supporters whose motives were inspired by pursuit of self-aggrandizement, rather than a swift and victorious end to the war:

The sweetnesse of commanding without controulment dooth so greatlie delight them, and they find such a plesantnesse in disposing at their pleasure of the king's revennewes, of the benevolences and sutes of his people: that they could be contented that the Realme should still be tumbled and turmoiled upside downe, rather than they would with their good wils ever leave that trade of life.⁵³

Michel Hurault firmly contended that the greed of the great lords and some ministers became all-consuming: "To be short, they must have another kingdome made for them: for in this there is not enough to reward them."⁵⁴ Henri needed to rely upon these men in positions of command and

responsibility, and it was necessary to place them in positions where they would be most effective and cause the least trouble. Some, like Montmorency, Lesdiguières and Condé, were powerful nobles who refused to stray from their governments but who possessed the loyalty of the local people and an intimate knowledge of the area and its conditions. On the other hand, it would have been impolitic of Henri to remove from their commands the nobles who had submitted in 1589. Hence, La Valette remained in command in Provence and this position was later transferred to his brother, Épernon, after his death in 1592, and Tavannes remained in Burgundy. Yet there existed a common denominator. Each man commanded the sectors of the Protestant-Royalist defence system wherein lay his personal estates. In each case Henri was concerned with the practicalities of local loyalties and knowledge of the area so that his generals were well-prepared for their duties. But, more importantly, the king probably knew that by maintaining his generals and governors in command of sectors containing their estates, their willingness to organize the defence, to fight the enemy and to win would be considerably increased. For the survival of their possessions intact and the lands which gave them their titles and wealth depended upon their success.

Many whiggish historians have implied in the past that it was the close knit unity of Henri's noble supporters and commanders--added to the vitality of the new religion--which provided the basis on which Henri de Navarre was able to rely to lead him to ultimate victory, although there were individuals who caused trouble from time to time. But contemporaries

amongst Henri's supporters completely disagreed with any such notions, arguing that the bonds uniting the Protestant-Royalist Party were not very strong and that it was the vitality and ability of Henri's leadership, above anything else, which provided the strength that led the party to ultimate victory. In fact, three separate factions surfaced very quickly within the Protestant-Royalist Party structure. The first faction included the rigid and obstinate Protestants who were unhappy that the king had agreed to receive Catholic instruction sometime in the future; the second group was composed of the zealous--"or pretended zealous"--Catholics, who endeavoured to separate Henri from the Protestants; the third group embodied the old servants and courtiers of the late king, who joined to pursue the good of the state or personal advancement. About 1592 these factions were joined by a fourth group led by the king's cousin, the cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon, an ambitious young man who entertained thoughts for the crown himself; he stirred up the Catholics, believing that if Navarre refused Catholicism, he would be excluded from the throne, leaving Vendôme-Bourbon to take advantage of the circumstances. This last faction, known as the Tiers Parti, was the most dangerous group within the party.⁵⁵

It was abundantly apparent to contemporaries outside Henri's entourage that the king of Navarre's party was by no means united. Cavriana, the Tuscan ambassador, wrote to his superiors in 1588 that "men are not combating for the faith, nor for Christ, but solely for command".⁵⁶ The ambassador defended the duc d'Épernon in the same dispatch:

Men cry out against Épernon . . . but were Épernon to die,
another and yet another Épernon would arise to take his place.
Everybody wants to command.⁵⁷

This frequently poor state of affairs in the high command spread downward into the lower ranks, where partisan officers fought among themselves and splintered into little factions of hostility. Much of the trouble arose from pride, personal jealousy and social rank, yet one cannot deny the role of simple irresponsibility. Contemporary memoirists and historians reveal quite plainly the mutual animosity felt by numerous noblemen, and on reflection, it seems incredible that either the party or its armies held together. Certainly this reveals something of the flexibility of Henri's leadership and his very real ability in sustaining the buffeting of heavy criticism and party factionalism.

Marshal Biron remained a thorn in the king's side, and Sully was bitterly opposed to him. He blamed the marshal for the success of the sieur de Villar's sortie from Rouen (1592) which ruined the Royalist siege works, claiming the incident was due to the negligence of Biron. However, Henri de Navarre was unable to accuse him "for fear of a dispute, and that he would not put underfoot some factions with the most malicious Catholics".⁵⁸ In short, the king could not condemn the old soldier, nor his party of Catholic supporters, when they were so influential and so badly needed.

Biron was by no means the only stumbling block to the transmission of the king's will. Other rivalries between Protestant leaders also required the king's arbitration, and more important matters were allowed to dangle while Henri became involved in finding solutions to apparently

secondary concerns. For example, in 1594 the duc de Montmorency was ordered to dispatch reinforcements to the duc de Lesdiguières, but initially he refused to send the soldiers because of the rivalry that existed between the two men and the fear of Montmorency that these extra troops would be used in an attack on his nephew-by-marriage, Épernon. The issue was resolved only under pressure from the king.⁵⁹ Another serious case was that of the vicomte de Turenne and the duc de Nevers who were ordered to assault the towns of Le Castelet and La Capelle together; but because the army marched without sufficient munitions and supplies, it was severely limited in its effectiveness, and each accused the other of the oversight while insisting on the governments of the two towns for himself.⁶⁰

Jealousy affected even those who supported Henri de Navarre without reservation. There existed a heated rivalry between the duc de Sully and Philippe du Plessis-Mornay, and so bitter was the struggle that Sully's name appears twice only in the memoirs of Mme. de Mornay, who adopted her husband's hatreds. The dispute arose in 1589, largely over recognition for the achievement of an alliance between Henri de Navarre and King Henri III, originally negotiated by Sully but--when he fell ill--completed by Duplessis-Mornay. Sully eventually wrote:

Duplessis took advantage of this accident to deprive me of the honour of a treaty which he had only the trouble of drawing up . . . Saumur was the place of security agreed on, and Duplessis did not fail to procure the government of it, as a fit reward for him to whom they were obliged for the success of the treaty. This proceeding appeared to me so extremely unjustifiable, that I complained loudly of Duplessis, and even of the King of Navarre himself. . . .⁶¹

And later Sully became involved in so bitter an argument with the marquis d'Andelot, over the minor matter of possession of the League standard captured at Ivry, that the latter actually deserted Henri de Navarre to join the League. The marquis was the younger brother of the doyen of the party, Admiral Coligny, uncle to the young duc de Châtillon and cousin to the duc de Montmorency. The Coligny family name represented one of the principal supports of French Calvinism, and six scions of that noble house gave their lives in the service of their faith; so to lose a man of d'Andelot's position to the enemy over such a petty squabble was a serious blow to the party and to the army.

Many of the differences erupting between party members followed from the essential need for an organized military hierarchy through which orders and responsibilities could be passed without hindrance. Neither a system of responsibilities nor a structure of ranks delegating gradations of authority existed, and these deficiencies impeded the smooth transmission of orders from an officer of higher authority to an officer of lower authority, or from the king to a servant. Whose authority predominated in the absence of the king--a marshal of France or a prince of the blood? Could military rank be equated with noble status? How long was the tenure of a commission, and what authority did its owner possess? These were questions that were to be examined later in the reign of Henri IV and answered--at least in part--in the reign of his successor, Louis XIII. But at this time they remained unanswerable, adding to the general confusion in military affairs and frequently requiring Navarre's personal

supervision on a day to day basis.

It follows, then, that this left noble officers great scope to inflate their positions within the military structure on the basis of social rather than military rank. For example, in 1592 the sieur de Tavannes wrote to the king, complaining that Marshal d'Aumont's activities were ruining six years of his work in Burgundy. The marshal had been sent earlier with an army to supervise Protestant-Royalist affairs in the province, thus lending the prestige of his title to the struggle. But Tavannes insisted that he be replaced by another prince or marshal.⁶² This raised a question of authority. Had d'Aumont, as a maréchal de France, more authority to command in Burgundy, or had Tavannes, as Henri's lieutenant-general, superior authority as the king's immediate representative in that province? Forty years later, a maréchal would be recognized above provincial lieutenants-general or even governors, but at this point, because the situation was undefined, Tavannes predominated. In 1594 d'Aumont was recalled and the young baron de Biron sent in his place. In his memoirs, Tavannes later gave himself the lion's share of credit for the party's success in Burgundy, claiming d'Aumont did more harm than good, though grudgingly admitting that young Biron contributed to the king's success somewhat.⁶³

This question of authority and rank plagued Henri on other occasions. In 1589, when the king returned to his army camped before Rouen (it was then marching to Arques), he found a difference of opinion between the duc de Montpensier and Marshal Biron. In the brief absence

of the king, Montpensier--as a prince of the blood--claimed command of the army. But Biron disagreed with this, "saying that he was a marshal of France, and was by consequence lieutenant-general of the camps and armies of the King", and should command always whenever the king was not present. To restore peace, Henri spoke to Montpensier of the difficulty and they agreed to allow Biron to command.⁶⁴ One wonders whether Henri so decided in order to establish some kind of relationship between the authority of a maréchal and a prince of the blood royal, or whether he decided in deference to the enormous influence that Biron wielded among his Catholic followers.

Elsewhere, the command controversy arose between princes of the blood and provincial governors. The comte de Soissons insisted on supreme command in the army being sent to Picardy after the battle of Arques (1589). The duc de Longueville retorted that in that province, where he was governor, he would tolerate no other commander than himself. François de La Noue was on hand, however, to recommend a compromise "with his customary wisdom". He said that Marshal d'Aumont should be given command as the lieutenant-general. This advice Henri followed,⁶⁵ and it solved the immediate problem of personal rivalries although it further confused the issue by placing the ranks of prince, marshal, lieutenant-general and provincial governor on the same level.

In 1593 Soissons was again bickering over his rights to command, this time with the duc de Montpensier who was also a prince of the blood. Their "enmity was first occasioned by some disputes relating to the

prerogatives of their rank as princes of the blood, and afterwards strengthened and confirmed by their competition for the same posts, the same governments, and above all, for the same mistress, who was the princess Catherine, sister to the king".⁶⁶ Sully was sent by Henri to attempt to solve the difficulties between the two men, which he was able to achieve eventually.

When the duc d'Angoulême eventually wrote his memoirs of the Arques campaign, about 1646, he explained very succinctly the crux of the problem. Maréchaux-de-France were granted royal authority to lead armies; but when the king had not provided them with a definite commission to lead a particular army, they had no right to assume command by themselves or on the suggestion of others. Only the king could grant a commission and no marshal could usurp it.⁶⁷

After the prince of Parma's second retreat in 1592, Henri IV had much trouble in his army. His council of war, dominated by Biron, suffered conflicts of interest but seemed united against his plans for pursuit. The marquis d'O and vicomte de Turenne opposed him openly. The Swiss and German mercenaries refused to march or threatened to join the League if they were left unpaid.

Most important, however, was the increasingly critical religious dispute which divided the party and caused distrust which spilled over into military matters. Observing the king's obvious attempts to compromise with his Catholic supporters to maintain their assistance, the Protestants in the army feared that he was sacrificing them to Catholic interests.

Naturally Henri was afraid to alienate his Protestant followers, for they formed the sturdiest foundation of his authority. Therefore, following a suggestion of Turenne, he required the Catholic nobles and gentlemen of his party to sign a formal statement, confirming unchanged all rights granted to the Protestants under Henri III. Neither were any measures to be adopted to change nor to alter the articles, pending the king's instruction. This "Declaration of Mantes" was published on 16 May 1593.⁶⁸

Comparably, the Catholics could be just as dissatisfied with the king and his Protestant religion, and refused to carry out their orders and threatened to join the League unless Henri abjured his faith. Duplessis-Mornay wrote of the Catholic royalists:

Our Catholics desire peace at all risks; they blame us [the Huguenots] and say that everything depends on the king, that for the sake of an opinion he is losing the state; and thereupon, one after another, they enter into private truces which go so far that one of these days the king will be sustaining the war alone.⁶⁹

In the early 1590's the concerns of Henri's Catholic supporters opened a dangerous rift in the party and the royal family. Many Catholic noblemen who had lost hope in Henri IV's conversion turned to the Tiers Parti. Led by the young cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon,⁷⁰ this faction soon included the comte de Soissons, the duc de Nevers, the duc de Longueville and the marquis d'Orléans with a host of lesser Catholic nobles, many of whom held military commands under Henri.⁷¹ One can only guess how important was this factor in forcing the king to convert finally to Catholicism before his coronation. Henri was astute enough to realize that he would have to convert sometime, but he wished his conversion to be at the time of his

own choosing and not at the demand of his subjects. Henri's decision to abjure was a major one, but in the final analysis, his conversion was merely another compromise granted to his subjects from a long list.

With the rumours spreading in 1593 of Navarre's impending conversion, the Catholics in his party quickly promised those of the "religion called reformed" that they would continue to work together and remain united in the king's cause;⁷² and when Henri at last declared his intentions, the news was met with pleasure from his Catholic supporters and by not a few of his Protestant advisers, who saw his conversion as the only means to preserve the state.

With Henri's conversion, the sole obstacle that had separated otherwise loyal Catholic Frenchmen from their rightful king had been removed; support for the League and its cause thus waned rapidly, as also did that for individual rivals--Soissons and cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon in particular. On the other hand, opposition from die-hard Huguenots was devastated when the great Protestant leaders of the party (except Duplessis-Mornay who was unable to reconcile faith with politics) fell, one-by-one, behind the king in active support and encouragement of his policy.

To assume that the focus of Protestant-Royalist activity concentrated only on the high command, without influence from below, would be simplistic. The common people, who formed armies and paid the taxes which kept them in the field, often have been neglected in the past or presented as simple individuals who meekly accepted their role in the

civil wars and who quietly followed their leaders into action without question, but this was simply not the case. Indeed, conditions below influenced policy from above far more than earlier historians seem to have recognized. Notice has been taken of problems of recruitment, the war effort maintained by the towns, the institution of martial law to prevent revolt, problems between the garrisons and townsmen and, finally, the economic conditions that struck the peasantry sometimes more severely than any acts of war. There remain yet to be considered the problems frequently faced by individual commanders who attempted to force a very reluctant and independent civilian class into obedience.

If the civil wars had taught the Protestant commoner one thing, it was the art of survival. Experience had shown that stout walls, determination, full granaries and mutual support could resist all but the most determined and protracted assaults. This also engendered a feeling of confidence and independence, among urban centres in particular, which gave them the strength to act without direction or the need for direction from the party leadership. A major task before Henri de Navarre and his generals, then, was to force unwilling towns into obedience, afterwards organizing them under the command of a nobleman to concentrate their energies on the general goal. This was no easy task.

There were other problems, too. Castres, where Henri de Navarre confirmed his alliance with the duc de Montmorency in 1585, was an unusual case. It was rare that Protestants and Catholics lived together in the same town, as twenty-five years of warfare had, in most cases, rendered

the towns either wholly of one faith or the other, as the majority massacred or drove away their less numerous neighbours. When Henri left Castres, the Catholic citizens requested from Montmorency a Catholic garrison for their security and safety. Obviously, they were concerned that if a Calvinist garrison defended the town, a Saint Bartholemew's Day in reverse might break out. They also wanted the use of the Huguenot Villegouder Temple for their worship services. Montmorency promised to take them all under his protection, but as the temple was already in use by the Protestants he told them he would find them another one equally as good.⁷³ Apparently these assurances satisfied them.

The sieur de Tavannes once remarked that Henri forced the towns unwillingly into war, and his accusation--while perhaps exaggerated--was not without foundation. While marching to the battle of Arques (1589), Henri passed through Tréport. The inhabitants, though they rushed to meet and to praise him, asked him to end the war and their misery; nevertheless, Henri got 20,000 francs and a large amount of grain for the army from them.⁷⁴ The most important duty of any urban or provincial governor was to maintain the loyalty and services of the town(s) under his command. The loss of important centres like Bordeaux or Dieppe would have dealt a terrific blow to the Protestant-Royalist Party, while the loss of even insignificant towns spelt the disappearance of another supply depot or recruitment centre. Matignon had to crush a revolt in Bordeaux in 1586. And in 1590, when the governor of Dieppe fell ill, papists tried to take the city in the name of the Holy League; but the governor found out about

the plot, and the conspirators were exiled or executed and their property was confiscated.⁷⁵

However, sometimes urban upheavals resulted not from lack of loyalty but rather as a reaction to an unbending local governor. In 1586 the people of the town of Milhaud--fearful of a League attack by Joyeuse--requested the duc de Châtillon to become their governor, to bring a garrison and to provide engineers to rebuild the old fortifications. Châtillon complied with the request, but the inhabitants were offended when they found that they were required to pay all the bills while they no longer enjoyed the same freedoms they had had when governed solely by the mayor and town council. When the duke was called away, leaving the sieur de Saint-Auban in charge of Milhaud, the inhabitants took the opportunity to revolt, ejecting the small garrison and destroying some of the new work on the unfinished fortifications. Saint-Auban recorded that the people of Milhaud, "In great perfidy and marked ingratitude", tried to kill him, alleging that they were sick of his over-bearing manner and unwarranted cruelty. He managed to escape to nearby Saint-Roman, collected his men and marched back, quickly making himself master of the town after crushing all resistance.⁷⁶

This was by no means an isolated case. In 1587 the comte de Montgomery, Montmorency's lieutenant in upper Languedoc, had further trouble with the important town of Castres. In addition to the on-going problem of the religious division among the townsmen, Montgomery was personally unpopular, and the honesty of one of his lieutenants, Bousquet, was in

question because he received pay not only as the second consul in the town but also as a gendarme in the count's company of horse. However, through the intervention of the other three consuls, the immediate problems were resolved, and it was decided finally to send a deputation to the duc de Montmorency to advise him of the dispute with Montgomery. The latter tried to present his case in advance of the town delegation, but he reached Montmorency's headquarters in Lunel at the same time as they.

Montmorency acknowledged the situation was grave while, at the same time, realizing that he could afford neither to anger so important a town as Castres nor to ruin or disgrace so important a noble as Montgomery.⁷⁷ Caught on the horns of a dilemma, the duke decided to retain Montgomery as his governor, a simple expedient forced on him by the current conditions of the campaign. Nevertheless, the appeals of the people of Castres did not fall on deaf ears. Shortly afterward, the duke quietly removed Montgomery from his command, replacing him briefly with Turenne and finally, in June 1592, with the sieur de Chambaud. The latter arrived in the town with a company of foot and a company of horse "to the contentment of everyone".⁷⁸

Earlier, the Protestant assembly which met at La Rochelle in 1588 attempted to interfere with the command in Languedoc, supporting the succession of the sieur d'Avantigny to the governorship as Navarre's lieutenant. "This greatly angered the comte de Montgomery, who remained, nevertheless, by the support of the duc de Montmorency, the one who forced the sieur d'Avantigny to retire the following month of May [1589]."⁷⁹

Montmorency may have respected the appeals of the citizens of Castres, but he would tolerate no interference from an outside body in the province where he reigned as a virtual king.

One of the major crises that faced Henri de Navarre in the early years of the civil war originated at the Assembly of the Huguenot deputies and churches at La Rochelle in 1588, a concerted attack--made by non-noble deputies, backed by aristocratic support--directed at the party leadership. The protestant delegates--representing the nobility and third estate--came from every province and county which boasted Protestant supporters.⁸⁰ The opposition feared that the king had adopted a new role, speaking no longer of Huguenot protection and rights but of preservation of the state.⁸¹ The assembly then, became a platform from which disgruntled parish vicars could denounce the king's policy, and in late autumn Henri needed to go to La Rochelle personally "to find the means to defend himself against so many enemies".⁸²

The assembly itself opened on 15 November, and the underlying current gradually turned against Henri de Navarre. The delegates--suspicious of his offers for personal instruction--magnified his mistakes and failed to mention his many services. One suspects that Henri had called the assembly in November after the death of the one man who could legitimately assume overall leadership at the party's request--the prince de Condé. However, the ambitious vicomte de Turenne tried to assume the position left by the late prince, "and acted towards the king of Navarre as the duc de Guise did towards Henri III". However:

. . . the King of Navarre was not a little helped by the services of M. Duplessis against several changes that were to be feared, originating in the misfortunes that they had seen in several matters, namely in the foreign army [von Dohna and the Reiters, 1587], on which some people seized the occasion to accuse the said lord King of Navarre, and to limit his authority in the conduct of affairs.⁸³

Duplessis-Mornay was listened to carefully, for his position in the party and the offices he held increased the weight of his words. Nor did Henri leave his defence entirely in his supporter's hands; he punctuated Duplessis-Mornay's words with his military actions, taking La Ganache and Niort from the Leaguers, who were then involved in their own estates at Blois.⁸⁴ The result of this close cooperation was the neat devastation both of the complaints of Henri's critics and the reputation of Turenne. The Assembly could do little else but thank Henri for his work and praise him as their leader.⁸⁵

The second great crisis that shook the party to its core was the succession issue in 1589. Henri de Navarre's skillful manipulation of events, his willingness to compromise to a degree with everyone involved and the common hatred felt for the League by Protestant and politique alike combined to conquer a threat which conceivably could have ruined the party absolutely and assured a League triumph. However, the crisis revealed most clearly the divergence of interests and the factions or individuals who held them.

As King Henri III lay on his death bed, he named Henri de Navarre his legitimate successor:

I know, and I dare assure you, that the King of Navarre my brother-in-law, the lawful successor to this crowne, is sufficiently instructed in the lawes, to know how to raigne well, and to command reasonable things: and I hope, you are not ignorant of the just obedience you owe unto him.⁸⁶

With the king's death, the parties rapidly formed. The marquis d'O and his followers considered excluding Henri de Navarre from the throne altogether. Maréchal de Biron and his supporters, though relatively moderate, wished to see Henri accept the title of Captain General until such time as the major cities under the League yoke accepted the new king, in order to preserve them from the Spanish grasp. This was nothing more than a different type of exclusion. Harlay de Sancy and other loyal Huguenots argued that Henri de Navarre was king of France already by right of birth and asked what hope could he have of winning more support for his cause if his own supporters granted him no higher title than Captain General.⁸⁷ The Catholic nobles in the army decided to commit themselves firmly to Henri's cause only if he should satisfy extensive conditions: 1) that the king would receive instruction in the Catholic service and doctrines within six months; 2) that the king would suspend the practice of the "Reformed Religion" for six months, permitting the exercise of no faith save Catholicism and without introducing any innovations or changes in its worship or government; 3) that the king would grant no office or appointment to any Protestant; and 4) that the king would allow his loyal Catholic servants to send delegates to Rome to defend their reasons for joining a "relapsed heretic" in a common struggle.⁸⁸ The king accepted their conditions, with the exception of the second one

which he had altered to read that the king would reestablish Catholicism in all territories under his control.⁸⁹ He agreed also to fill all vacant ecclesiastical positions, to maintain in office all present incumbents, to give to Catholic officers all captured towns except one in each bailiwick and sénéchausée which was to be given a Protestant governor, and to punish those guilty for the murder of Henri III.⁹⁰

Reasons unconnected with religion also affected the loyalties of particular Catholic noble commanders. In a private discussion with Harlay de Sancy, for example, Marshal Biron told him that he doubted that Henri would have any use for his old supporters once he was secured on his throne and that the time had come for royal leaders to look out for their own interests. When Sancy informed Henri of the conversation, the king gave Biron the government of the Perigord.⁹¹ Some Catholics, like the sieurs de Givry and d'Humières, willingly swore loyalty to the king while others--being either estranged or exasperated by some grievance, kept at a distance; but all wanted lands or governments. Others proved troublesome (like the duc d'Angoulême, the duc d'Épernon and the duc de Bellegarde), opposing Henri on this occasion because they were fearful of losing their positions as favourites that they had held under the late Valois king.

The attitude of Henri's "loyal" officers is illustrated by the list of titles, gifts and rewards that exchanged hands within a very short space of time. Navarre learned very quickly that, to become king, he would have to buy the support of his servants or lose them to the enemy. It was a policy that proved particularly effective in the final submission

of the League nobility. On 4 August the "Declaration of St. Cloud", publicizing Henri's promises, was signed by the king. This was followed with a second document, formally recognizing Henri de Navarre as King Henri IV of France, signed by the prince de Conti, the ducs de Montpensier, Longueville and Piney, Marshals Biron and d'Aumont and many other nobles.⁹²

Thus satisfied about religion and job security, many men were very willing to fall in behind their king without further question. Sully was sent to d'Aumont to convince him to procure the loyalty of the French Guards and their officers. Sancy and Biron were sent also to ensure the continued service of the late king's Swiss and lansquenets troops respectively. (Sancy succeeded so well in his task that the Catholic Swiss agreed to serve the Protestant king, swearing an oath to do so without payment for three months.) Fortunately, he also was assured the loyalty of a number of nobles from the Île de France, Picardy and Auvergne, which gave him an important foothold in those predominantly League-controlled provinces.⁹³ Finally, Henri applied himself to gain increased foreign support, notably from the Protestant German states, England, Flanders, Switzerland, and the republic of Venice, by advising them of Henri III's death and his own succession to the French throne.⁹⁴

With this initial exchange of conditions and confirmations of loyalty, Henri IV was proclaimed King of France in front of the army, "after the ancient manner of the Emperours of the Romanes" instead of the ancient ceremonies "with holy oyle, holy water, holy toys and holy trashes".⁹⁵ The Royalist nobility--Catholic and Protestant--by and large

joined their king, even though many "Officers of the old Court staid with the King more by reason of their interest than Inclination",⁹⁶ afraid of losing their ranks and titles. Turenne clearly pointed out that the association often was one of need, "there having always [been] a notable misunderstanding between the servants of the King and those of the League".⁹⁷

A few nobles deserted the now Protestant-Royalist Party to join the League or to hold aloof, either through League offers of reward or simply because they would not serve a Huguenot king:

The Duke of Nevers stood in a king of Neutrality . . . He persisted in those sentiments a long time, and it was nothing but the Kings Victories which determined him to his service. In the Provinces, the Governours of Places who held for the King [Henri III], did in a manner the same thing. Some were bought, others promising to obey, declared without ceremony, that they should do it with regret whilst the King continued an Heretick . . .⁹⁸

The great favourite of the late king, the duc d'Épernon, refused to submit to Henri IV as king of France for reasons of religion and in memory of his former master. He protested that he would become neither a Spaniard nor a Leaguer but that his conscience would not allow him to stay with Henri IV. He asked the king to be allowed to leave the army to go into his provinces; Henri was reluctant to agree, but gave him permission anyway. The marquis de Vitry left Henri and threw himself into Paris-- he refused to accept a Protestant as king so he joined the League. Even the duc de La Trémouille was shaken in his loyalty to Henri. Thus it was that "Some resolved to retire as neutres, to see how the chance of armes would fall: others aspired to change their partie, and made scruple to follow a King of another Religion".⁹⁹ Despite these defections, Henri

"was by common consent of the army, and as the necessitie of the time and place did suffer, publikly proclaimed King".¹⁰⁰

As for the princes of the blood, Henri's succession was not eagerly accepted by his cousins, several of whom had schemes to gain rewards and titles instead of providing firm support for the head of their family; and because they were in the line of succession, they could present an obstacle to Henri IV's plans.¹⁰¹ Even Montmorency's quick assertion of his loyalty and continued support was not free from "conditions"; Henri promised the constable's baton and a good marriage for his eldest daughter, Charlotte, pledges which were eventually fulfilled.¹⁰²

These negotiations were of great military significance. When the duc d'Épernon withdrew to his governments of Saintonge and Angoumois in armed neutrality, he took 7,000 men from the combined royal army with him. "But his Example proved of considerable consequence, because the Lords and Captains retired likewise, and the Troops disbanded themselves, and the fine Army, which would easily have brought Paris, and the League to reasonable terms, dispersed in a few days." Each noble took with him the soldiers he commanded, which reduced the royal army from 40,000 men to approximately 20,000 men. "See how an army of more than 40,000 men was reduced by the loss of one."¹⁰³ This rendered the king's positions around Paris vulnerable to attack from Mayenne's newly assembled, powerful army. In his subsequent retreat, Henri divided his remaining strength into three armies (one under Longueville destined for Picardy, the second under d'Aumont for Champagne and the third under his personal command for

Normandy). This left him dangerously short of manpower for the future battle of Arques. One thing should be added, however: despite the loss of these nobles to the enemy or to neutrality, it was a temporary loss only. The king's conversion in 1593-1594 inspired most to return to the king's service and not a few Leaguers to abandon their party.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Péréfixe, pp. 75-76.
- ²Ibid.
- ³L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 365-366.
- ⁴Péréfixe, p. VI; Pierre Matthieu, The heroyk life of Henry the fourth, E. Grimeston, trans., London: 1612, p. 8.
- ⁵Abridgement of the life of Henry the Great, N. Butter, trans., London: 1637, p. 3.
- ⁶Edmund Skory, An Estract out of the historie of the French King Henry the fourth, London: 1610, p. B.
- ⁷Péréfixe, p. 103.
- ⁸"The Discoverer of France", E. Aggas, trans., London: 1590, p. 12.
- ⁹Angoulême, p. 76.
- ¹⁰Péréfixe, p. 58.
- ¹¹Sully, (M. & P.), p. 86. See also pp. 90 and 95 for other occasions.
- ¹²Ibid., (Scott), p. 261.
- ¹³Ibid., Jean de Serres echoed these thoughts when he wrote: "He chooseth rather to exceed the limits of valour, then to be noted of any cowardise." (p. 931, vol. III.)
- ¹⁴Garrett Mattingly, The Armada, Boston: 1959.
- ¹⁵L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 27.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 57, 67, 69, 70. See also "A Discourse of all such Fights, Skirmishes, Exploites, and other politike attempts which have happened in France since the arivall of the Duke of Parma, and the joyning of his Forces with the Enemies", London: 1590, p. 7; Serres, vol. III, p. 897; Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, p. 59.

¹⁷Henri IV, L. M., vol. III, p. 285 ff.

¹⁸Henri IV to the sieur de Beauvoir, October 1590, Ibid., pp. 284-286. Beauvoir was Henri's ambassador to the court of Elizabeth I.

¹⁹Serres, vol. III, p. 897.

²⁰Colynet, pp. 38, 158-159; Abridgement of Henry, pp. 4-5; Henri IV, L. M., vol. II, pp. 21, 28; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. III, p. 12; _____, "A Discourse upon the present state of France", London: 1588, p. 7; Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, pp. 15, 17-18; Gaches, p. 341.

²¹Colynet, pp. 158-159.

²²Duplessis-Mornay, "An Advertisement from a French Gentleman, touching the intention and meaning which those of the house of Guise have in their late levyng of forces and Armes in the Realme of France: Written as an answer to a certaine Declaration published in the name of the Cardinal of Bourbon", London: 1585, p. 25; _____, "France, 1588", p. 20; Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, pp. 10-11.

²³Colynet, p. 45; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. IV, p. 335; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 175; Hurault, "France, 1591", p. 3; L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 624; "An Admonition given by one of the Duke of Savoyes Councel to his Highnesse, Tending to dissuade him from enterprising against France", E. Aggas, trans., London: 1589, p. 6; Henri IV, L. M., vol. II, pp. 471, 477, 487.

²⁴L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 383; d'Aubigné, vol. VI, pp. 194-195; "Admonition to Savoye", pp. 14-17; Hurault, Antisixtus, passim; Williams, "Newes from Sir Roger Williams", London: 1591, "Court of Parliament in Normandy, decisions"; Gaches, p. 305; Péréfixe, pp. 49-50; Colynet, p. 103; Henri IV, L. M., vol. II, pp. 130, 398, 409, 443-458; vol. III, pp. 1-2, 6. See also the frequent letters sent by the king to the nobles, clergy and commons of France found throughout the lettre Missives and the Mémoires of Duplessis-Mornay.

²⁵L'Estoile, Henri III, pp. 492, 641; Henri IV, pp. 42, 335-336; Colynet, p. 435; Duplessis-Mornay, "An Advertisement", p. 33; Henri IV, L. M., vol. III, p. 44; "Remonstrances to the Duke de Mayne", London: 1593, pp. 12-15. For examples of League cruelty, see Colynet, p. 155; L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 640.

²⁶L'Estoile, Henri III, p. 640.

²⁷Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, p. 39; Serres, vol. III, pp. 922-925; L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 391, 417.

²⁸L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 396-397.

²⁹Ibid., p. 444. See also, pp. 393 and 456. For more on the reduction of Paris, see pp. 342-343, 381-391; Henri IV, L. M., vol. IV, p. 118.

³⁰Ibid., Henri III, pp. 364-365; Henri IV, pp. 243-244, 261, 328-329; Edmund de L'allouette, "A Catholick Apologie against the Libels, Declarations, Advices, and Consultations made, written and published by those of the League, perturbors of the quiet Estate of the Realme of France. Who are risen since the decease of the late Monsier, the Kings onely brother", E. Aggas, trans., London: [1588 or 1589], p. 54; Serres, vol. III, p. 864; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 223; Simon Goulart, ed., Mémoires de la Ligue. Contenant les evenemens les plus remarquables depuis 1576, jusqu'a la paix accordee entre le Roi de France et le Roi d'Espagne, en 1598, 6 vols. (Amsterdam: 1758), pp. 295-304; Pierre-Victor Palma Cayet, Chronologie Novenaire, in Michaud et Poujoulat, vol. 12, Paris: 1854, pp. 425-429, 445.

³¹Davila, pp. 587-588; Sully, (M. & P.), p. 109; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. V, pp. 231, 232-234; Villeroy, p. 208; Cheverny, p. 524; Benoist, p. 57; Jeannin to Bellièvre, 25 September 1592, quoted in Dickerman, vol. II, pp. 62 and 66; Palm, p. 193; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 271; L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 437-438.

³²For more on the king's conversion, see: L'allouette, "A Catholic Apologie", p. 26; L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 249, 298, 299, 302 and 366.

³³Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, p. 32.

³⁴Serres, vol. III, p. 944; Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. V, p. 303.

³⁵Quoted, *Péréfixe*, p. 157.

³⁶*Henri IV, L. M.*, vol. IV, p. 110; see also Duplessis-Mornay, *Mémoires*, vol. V, p. 334. Although Henri expended much money and had rewarded many men, the financial condition of the kingdom was still in such disorder that he instructed Bellièvre on 28 November 1594 to inform the nobles who had thus been bought that due to lack of funds, their promised pensions and indemnities would not be paid until the revenues for 1595 had been collected. (*L. M.*, vol. IV, pp. 266-267.)

³⁷*L'Estoile, Henri IV*, p. 401.

³⁸Sully, (Scott), p. 178.

³⁹Matthieu, *Heroyk life of Henry*, p. 9.

⁴⁰Sully, (M. & P.), p. 178.

⁴¹Matthieu, *Heroyk life of Henry*, p. 22.

⁴²Angoulême, pp. 70-75; Serres, vol. III, p. 886; *Péréfixe*, pp. 89-92; Colynet, p. 415. Mayenne had an advantage of 10:1 at Arques.

⁴³Serres, vol. III, pp. 890-893; Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 192; *Péréfixe*, pp. 97-102; Étienne Pasquier, pp. 452-455; Colynet, pp. 452-457; Matthieu, *Heroyk life of Henri*, pp. 23-24.

⁴⁴Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 164.

⁴⁵LaCretelle, vol. 3, p. 357.

⁴⁶Colynet, p. 456; Pasquier, p. 453; Serres, vol. III, p. 890.

⁴⁷Henri IV to Montmorency, 8 June 1595, *L. M.*, vol. IV, pp. 366-367.

⁴⁸Serres, vol. III, p. 903; Colynet, p. 451; Richard Wagmore to Walsingham, 10/20 April 1586, *C. S. P. For.*, vol. XX, p. 535.

⁴⁹(Scott), p. 173.

⁵⁰Pasquier to M. de Sainte-Marthe, 1586, p. 266.

⁵¹Henri IV to Montmorency, 19 June 1592, L. M., vol. III, pp. 638-639; Sully, (Scott), pp. 275-280; Péréfixe, pp. 135-139; L'Estoile, Henri IV, pp. 152, 163-170; Harrison, Elizabethan Journal, vol. I, pp. 121-122, 130; Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, pp. 29-30; Groulart, p. 558; "A True Relation of the Frenche Kinge his good success, in winning from the Duke of Parma, his forts and trenches, and slaieing 500. of his men, and the great famine that is now in the sayd Dukes Camp", London: 1592, passim; "The continuall following of the French king upon the Duke of Parma, the Duke of Guise, the Duke of Maine, and their Armies", E. White, Trans., London: 1592, passim; "A discourse of that which is past since the Kinges departure from Gouy, to pursue the Prince of Parma", London: 1592, passim; Leon Van Der Essen, Alexandre Farnèse, Prince de Parme, Gouverneur General des Pays-Bas (1545-1592), 5 vols., Brussels: 1937, vol. V, pp. 342-355.

⁵²LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 180.

⁵³Hurault, "France, 1591", pp. 32-33.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 33.

⁵⁵Péréfixe, pp. 124-125. Péréfixe wrote of the second faction that they whispered in Henri's ear, telling him that he should grant them power and titles. Of the third he wrote that the membership was composed largely of atheists and libertines who conspired with the most zealous of the Catholics.

⁵⁶Quoted, Cavriana to Serguide, 11 February (March) 1588, Baird, vol. II, pp. 26-27.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 28.

⁵⁸Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 96. Villars destroyed the siege works, burned supplies and blew up ammunition. Henri was away with his cavalry, attempting to slow down Parma's approach, and only learned of the blow several days later. See also L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 163.

⁵⁹Dickerman, vol. II, pp. 100-101. This does not presuppose, however, that the two notables always were governed by mutual rivalry. When Montmorency was . . . threatened by Joyeuse in October 1590, Lesdiguières quickly dispatched 300 cavalry. (Gaches, p. 406.)

⁶⁰Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 145.

⁶¹Ibid., p. 68.

⁶²Tavannes, p. 495. In fact, the sieur de Tavannes had requested the presence of a prince of the blood or a marshal in Burgundy to attract more support. The letter, although not quoted directly by Tavannes, was dated 18 May 1592.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 499-500.

⁶⁴Angoulême, p. 72.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 87.

⁶⁶Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, pp. 127-128. Mme. de Mornay wrote that Catherine was sought in marriage by the prince de Conti, the comte de Soissons and by the duc de Montpensier. (vol. I, p. 259.) Sully agreed with Mme. de Mornay, adding that Montpensier was most favourable to Henri. But Soissons possessed "entirely the heart of the princess", even if he was distrusted by the king.

⁶⁷Angoulême, p. 87. As a memoirist, Angoulême was able to draw upon long experience gained in years of faithful service to Henri IV and Louis XIII. He had fought in the wars of religion and later wars in which France had become involved, and he had witnessed the foundation of the Royal French army and its reconstruction under Richelieu. Hence he was well-equipped to comment on the transition of military rank over a very important period of military growth.

⁶⁸Duplessis-Mornay, Mémoires, vol. V, pp. 416-417.

⁶⁹Baird, vol. II, p. 303.

⁷⁰He was one of the four Condé brothers. Confirmed as the cardinal de Vendôme, he had exchanged this title for Bourbon on the death of his uncle (and the League candidate for the throne) in May 1590.

⁷¹Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, pp. 123-124. The title of the faction was a misnomer in that the politiques were considered to be in fact the "third party". However, the objectives of the politique nobles and the members of the new faction were diametrically opposed.

⁷²L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 252.

⁷³Gaches, p. 300.

⁷⁴Angoulême, p. 73.

⁷⁵"Credible Reports from France and Flanders. In the month of May, 1590" (London: 1590), p. 3. The governor, Chastes, was a sincere Catholic who had, like many, declared openly for the politiques.

⁷⁶St. Auban, p. 501.

⁷⁷Gaches, p. 353.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 431.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 383.

⁸⁰Baird, vol. II, p. 69.

⁸¹d'Aumale, vol. II, pp. 155-156.

⁸²Gaches, p. 377.

⁸³Mme. de Mornay, vol. I, p. 170.

⁸⁴Sully, (M. & P.), vol. XVI, p. 67.

⁸⁵Colynet, p. 300.

⁸⁶Quoted in Serres, vol. II, p. 880.

⁸⁷Baird, vol. II, pp. 170-171.

⁸⁸Péréfixe, pp. 83-84; Angoulême, p. 67; Benoist, pp. 55-56, 58; Philippi, p. 641; Colynet, p. 412; LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 353; Baird, vol. II, p. 174.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰Baird, vol. II, pp. 174-175.

⁹¹Péréfixe, pp. 80-82.

⁹²Baird, vol. II, p. 175.

⁹³Ibid., p. 170.

⁹⁴Sully, (Scott), vol. I, p. 210.

⁹⁵Colynet, p. 412.

⁹⁶Benoist, p. 56.

⁹⁷p. 54.

⁹⁸Benoist, p. 60. The italics were his.

⁹⁹Serres, vol. III, p. 884; Benoist, p. 60; L'Estoile, Henri IV, p. 645 ff.; Gassot, p. 213 ff.; Péréfixe, p. 85; Gaches, p. 394; LaCretelle, vol. III, p. 355; Baird, vol. II, p. 176.

¹⁰⁰Serres, vol. III, p. 884.

¹⁰¹Benoist, pp. 55-56; Péréfixe, p. 82; Gaches, p. 394.

¹⁰²Gaches, p. 394. Charlotte married the duc d'Angoulême in 1591.

¹⁰³Angoulême, p. 70.

CONCLUSION

The Protestant-Royalist Party was not as united as historians have thought in the past. Contemporaries were necessarily partisan in their outlook on the wars, while not a single pro-League history of the struggle was published. Modern liberal historians later assumed that the obvious strength of the healthy new religion (Calvinism) was responsible for the ultimate triumph in sharp contrast to the decadence and deterioration of the old faith (Catholicism). As a result, both contemporary observers and later historians were agreed in outlook in their generalizations of the Protestant-Royalist Party, suggesting that but for a few individuals who habitually caused trouble, the party was united on the whole and fought toward the common goal. This is inaccurate. The mutual distrust and suspicion felt by all groups within the party, plus extreme differences in goal--religious, political or material--suffice to shatter any conception of uniformity among the followers of Henri IV. It is only with closer examination of causes and affects that it is possible to see how these individual plans combined to place the king firmly on his throne. Problems of religion threatened to destroy the party on several occasions. Protestant suspicions that Henri had forgotten the true mission begun in 1585, coupled with fears that he had played into Catholic hands because he could not afford to lose their aid, pulled the party one way. Consistant Catholic pressure on the king to abjure his faith, added to the Catholics' distrust of a "relapsed heretic" who might abjure nominally but clearly would rather sit on the

throne as a Protestant, pulled the party another way. The private ambitions of many politique nobles, who saw the war as an opportunity to increase their wealth, and the treacherous designs of not a few of the king's own cousins pulled the party in yet a third direction. Finally, the rivalries for party leadership that endangered the king's position, and the prosecution of the war against the League pulled the party in a fourth manner. In the past it was believed that the ultimate Huguenot military victory was so long in coming due to the king's lack of ability, but party divisions and personal rivalries have been underplayed or dismissed altogether. What stands out most clearly, however, is that the majority of the men who served Henri IV were flexible. They responded to whichever way the winds of fortune blew. Had events gone badly in the field against the king, or had he been unequal to the task as supreme commander of resisting the unrelenting strain that pulled against the party internally, it is probable that they would have abandoned the king to his fate.

A question remains, however. If Henri was in fact in control of the party, and if his own ability was not at fault for the duration of the war, then why were his noble supporters and party factions able to prejudice his cause so often and for so long? The answer is found within the structure of the party itself. To begin with, every nobleman in Henri's ranks represented one more for him, one less for the enemy and a certain amount of support in cash, manpower or both. But their allegiance, however tentative, meant also that they were eligible for commands and

positions of responsibility within the party, plus rewards for their service after the war. The majority of this nobility was not paid by the king; instead, they had joined him of their own free will as volunteers for varying reasons. This relationship between the king and those who served him created complications that plagued Henri until the war's finish. First, if the king was unable to pay these aristocrats for their services, then he was unable to control them, even if, in theory, he had the authority to do so. Second, in terms of recruitment, ancient tradition had laid down a tour of duty lasting forty days only, according to the ban et arrière ban. Although it is unlikely that Henri called the ban, even after 1589, technically the same duration of service applied to the king's vassals. Third, the volunteer nobility serving in the king's army took the expense of campaigning onto their own shoulders. But equipment deteriorated and had to be replaced, while noble estates could not endure forever without some personal supervision, so these men had to return home from time to time to rest and supervise the lands which formed the basis of their wealth. Fourth, the independence of the nobleman was still widely accepted, leaving him free to do almost anything he wished. This reason alone explains the generous treatment received by rebelling aristocrats or nobles who had switched parties. Nor could this independence be challenged effectively by Henri until he sat firmly on the throne.

The position of the king himself must also be examined to determine his influence on internal affairs. After 1589 Henri commanded two equally bigotted groups. The Protestants on the one hand wanted not only to see

their faith solidly rooted in French soil but also to see Catholicism eliminated from the kingdom. The Catholics on the other hand were unwilling to tolerate heresy in France and would gladly have turned on their Protestant allies if they had not been joined in a common struggle on the king's behalf against the League. A third group of men could be added who did not care what happened, so long as they gained in the end. Thus it was that Henri was compelled to follow a course of compromise. He made concessions to the Catholics to maintain their support, while ensuring the Protestants of his continued favour. He made promises of rewards, and even granted many, to the third group in order to keep them quietly in line. In this case, the king can be described as a politique who followed a policy of moderation, while keeping one eye firmly fixed on his supporters and the other to the future.

If Henri had challenged his nobility overtly and tried to force them into a mold of obedience, secured by strict discipline, he would have lost them and the military power they represented. In short, he would have challenged the fundamental traditions of noble privilege and immunity just as effectively as the League lashed out against the fundamental laws of succession and government in France. He would have been as guilty of attempting to subvert the basic fibre of French social structure as the League was culpable of subverting the monarchy. Henri rewarded his nobles and enemies to secure their aid, to gain peace and to prevent future rebellion. Only after the war was it discovered that the nobility was so closely tied to the king who had given them their appointments and

who could take those appointments away, that it relied on the throne for future advancement.

Finally, Henri's relationship with his immediate subordinates was unique. He had to trust them in positions of responsibility whether he wanted to or not. They represented some of the greatest names in France, and thus wielded enormous power and prestige. The king of Navarre could not afford to alienate these aristocrats, many of whom were close blood relatives, especially prior to 1589 when the resources of the Bourbon family provided him with the greatest part of his strength. And even then, only the animosity felt by the League toward the Bourbons prevented some of his family members from leaving Henri's side, as in the case of the comte de Soissons. As it was, the king of Navarre was never really in full command of the Protestant-Royalist Party until 1589 when he was elevated to the French crown, and 1593 when his conversion rendered him virtually untouchable, sealing his eventual success. Until then he remained simply primus inter pares--first among equals--which left him open to assault from various directions. That Henri IV of France was able through compromise, manipulation and ingenuity to maintain the party's military equilibrium in the face of a thousand difficulties will remain his greatest achievement.

Still the king had a great advantage the impact of which was not felt until the end of the civil war in January 1595, and the worth of which has never been acknowledged. Never was a man as well served by the intervention of death--either natural or unnatural--as was King Henri IV of France. This was a contributor to Henri's success which is far more

meaningful when applied to the results of the struggle. Between 1586 and 1595 the majority of the most prominent leaders in any of the original three parties were killed in battle or through assassination, or died of illness or old age. Seventeen of the twenty-five most prominent members of the Protestant Party were removed in this fashion. Six of the twelve most important members of the Royalist Party of Henri III were struck down also. Likewise, nine of the eighteen principal chiefs of the League perished during the war.¹

Through death, Henri's own position was immeasurably strengthened. Death elevated him to the french throne, removed all of his rivals for party leadership, decimated the troublemakers within his party, opened opportunities for him that could be used in pacifying ambitious noblemen in his high command and put an end to not a few of the most ardent Leaguers who might otherwise have caused continuing problems. The intervention of death provided other advantages as well. Most importantly, it devastated most of the old party leadership among the Royalists, Protestants and Leaguers alike, leaving vacant positions that were impossible to fill by the remaining chiefs alone, or by the younger members of the parties who had neither the experience nor the support to command. This left Henri IV in a very strong and almost untouchable position--he was the last of the three great leaders who had begun the war in 1585, and unquestionably wielded, therefore, enormous authority. Although the intervention of death had as well struck at the nobler elements of his party--La Noue, Châtillon and Montpensier, for example--it freed Henri from the

obligation to reward these men which he could not have overlooked. It released him too from similar obligations to Henri III's old servants, who joined him in 1589, and to League aristocrats who submitted after 1593.

Yet, the crux of the problem regarding Henri's ability in warfare pivots on statements attributed to the prince of Parma and on superficial study of his campaigns. Moreover, earlier historians have delighted in comparing the varying abilities of the two men which results always in second place for Henri de Navarre. It is true that a narrowly focussed study of the king's military activities tends to support the stigma that had been attached to his reputation for 400 years, while a similar study of Parma's methods contributes to the disfavour with which Henri's activities are viewed. However, to attempt a comparison between the skills of both men is impossible in the light of the highly different conditions under which both men worked and which have so often been forgotten to Henri's detriment.

While Parma certainly deserves his reputation for genius in the field, one cannot and must not forget that he enjoyed advantages that the king of Navarre never could. Parma commanded a well-trained, disciplined and professional army which was united by religion and led by officers whose individual position within the hierarchy of ranks was well-known and undisputed. Furthermore, the Spanish could rely upon a large reservoir of men to reinforce depleted ranks and had available the wealth and backing of the Spanish-Habsburg empire. In a word, Parma was able to plan

and execute sweeping campaigns and formal siegecraft simply because he had the wherewithal to do so. Men, ammunition and supplies were plentiful although constant delays in the arrival of money did spark the occasional mutiny.

Henri de Navarre, on the other hand, had strength enough only to inch his way forward, avoiding open field battles until advantageous opportunities presented themselves or until he was absolutely forced to gamble for victory when events turned against him. He had neither the necessary force to engage in protracted campaigns nor sufficient backing from among non-Protestant Frenchmen or abroad to ensure plentiful reinforcements and supplies. Moreover, Henri had to deal with unscrupulous nobles, many of whom sought personal gain, and conflicts in politics, religion and personnel among those who served under him. Thus, his campaigns were brief of necessity and many were abandoned merely to keep his forces together. Sully, reflecting on Parma's escape in 1592, wrote that one should consider two questions:

First, how it happened that a prince, who in all his expeditions made use of mercenaries, picked up whenever he could find them, of different countries, manners, religions, and interests, often a very small number, and always ready to mutiny, was able to perform what is related of him? The second is, what this prince would have done, if, instead of such troops, he had a considerable number of well-disciplined soldiers under his command, all united, obedient to his will, constantly attached to his person, and willing to sacrifice their lives for him; in a word, such troops as those conquerors had, whose actions have been so highly extolled by posterity?²

Parma's invasions of France were masterpieces of manoeuvre and organization which clearly bear witness to the man's ability. Henri was all too frequently forced to withdraw from his objectives when on the verge

of victory by the timely arrival of Spanish relief. Parma manoeuvred masterfully to achieve his objectives with a minimum of loss, while Henri de Navarre--perhaps rashly--marched in vain to bring his opponent to battle. But, in the light of statements attributed to Parma, if he was so confident in Henri's lesser ability, why was it that he never met Navarre in pitched battle? It appears from his actions that Parma had a healthy respect for the king's ability in battle and was unwilling to gamble on a field engagement, fearing perhaps that Henri's forces might have been more than a match for his own. Matthieu wrote that the prince thought that Spanish intervention was wrong, saying that Henri would eventually prevail, "and that if the warre continued longer Spaine should have more wood to heate her oven, then come to send to the mill". Also, in direct contrast to earlier statements, Matthieu quoted Parma as saying:

That this Prince was an Eagle in warre which soared into the cloudes when they thought to take him, and fell sodenly upon them which held him to be farther off.³

Nevertheless, using Parma as a yardstick, Henri de Navarre has continued to be criticized. The king relied heavily on his cavalry and his critics have blamed him from turning a blind eye to developments in the infantry arm. But Henri's infantry arm was extremely limited in numbers and lacked the necessary stiffening of pikes, due to a serious shortage of the weapon. Hence, he wished to conserve them wherever possible, particularly as they formed his garrisons and provided the assault forces in siegecraft during a war which was essentially one for position. Furthermore, the nobility who served the king did so on

horseback, for it was from their ranks that Henri recruited his cavalry strength. These were proud men who saw participation in battle as not only a duty but also a privilege. Although the king abandoned it, the en haye cavalry formation of lancers clearly supports this view. Henri himself had a notable preference for cavalry as it gave him mobility and therefore the means to strike quickly and effectively along a large front. He could make up in speed what he lacked in numbers. Finally, all commanders still thought in terms of cavalry battles with limited participation by the infantry and artillery. Technically, it is true that infantry and artillery were becoming more numerous and the focus of battle was beginning to centre on them, but men's attitudes must not be forgotten. In this period, it mattered little how many men one commanded if the advantage of numbers was lost by a reliance on the cavalry arm. Nothing else would explain why all the pitched battles between the League and the Huguenots ended once the Catholic cavalry had been routed and scattered from the field by their tough Protestant counterparts.

Henri has been criticized as well for neglecting to follow up his victories until too late, if at all. From a strictly military point of view, this was indeed folly; but, Henri cannot be judged from a strictly military point of view. Problems within the high command required that he turn his attention to secondary matters, losing the newly-gained advantage. Also, the haughty independence of many of his generals--Condé, Turenne, Épernon and others--robbed Henri of large sections of his forces to pursue private ambitions, leaving the king to pursue the enemy seriously handicapped or forcing him to abandon the pursuit and direct his efforts

elsewhere. At Coutras in 1587 Henri was faced by the king of France's army. To have annihilated it would have been a direct assault on Henri III which Navarre could not afford, particularly as he always protested his loyalty to the Valois and at the same time tried to woo the king into an alliance with him. Although Henri might have taken Paris through siege on several occasions, even bringing the city to the brink of capitulation in 1590, he was forced time and again to withdraw at the approach of a Spanish relief force. Nor should Henri's personal attitudes be neglected--he recognized all too clearly that Paris would be uncontrollably sacked if she fell by force of arms, after which the surviving citizens would never freely accept him as their king.

The king of Navarre was criticized frequently for exposing himself too often to danger by personally leading his army in the attack. Contemporaries--many of them Henri's staunchest supporters--and later historians have scolded the king for his temerity. But Henri realized too clearly that only by his example could he maintain his leadership of the Protestant-Royalist Party. Until 1593, the Huguenots followed Henri in a religious cause to preserve their faith. Yet the politiques who had joined the king in 1585 and later in 1589 shared no common interest in preserving a faith they considered heretical. In short, they followed the man and not the cause, and for this reason alone Henri had to place himself always in the forefront, knowing that his example was the only thing which inspired Catholic loyalty. Once more, however, the prince of Parma is hailed as the perfect example of the man who wisely preserved

himself for his army. But it is useful to remember that he was wounded while standing in the front trenches at Caudebec in 1592--a wound which later killed him.

The fourth great criticism of the Huguenot king is his apparent ignorance of the greater science of strategy. Again, on a purely military level--separated from other conditions--this seems reasonable. However, the problems within the high command and the factionalism that strained the party at its seams prevented any attempts at a sweeping plan for victory in France. With the many threats to his leadership, Henri could not afford to gamble for high stakes until his position as leader was secure. The chronic lack of money and insufficiency of supply set constant problems before Henri which were not solved even until the end of the civil war in 1595. Unpaid, hungry soldiers often refused to march regardless of the prestige of their general. Comparably, the territoriality of troops prevented long-range campaigns. Modeled very closely after the medieval militia, the provincial troops could be enticed to go on a short campaign, but they refused to march too far away from home, considering themselves borrowed for a limited period of time. Added to this was the constant need for Henri's volunteer nobility to return home to refresh themselves and to check on their estates, which seriously depleted his cavalry and officer corps. These conditions forced the king to fight the war using Fabian strategy--defence, mobility, harrassment and delaying tactics--at least until 1592. However, during this time he did reveal periods of inspirations in strategy which proved his ability. In 1592 he

managed to encircle Parma in a dangerous trap at Yvetot; only the prince's careful attention to detail saved his army and his reputation when he passed the Seine River over a pontoon bridge brought along on the invasion to bridge rivers during his "advance". The words of the man who reputedly stated that he never was caught in a position where he had to retreat turned into so much bluster.

Faced with the unlimited difficulties that were strewn along his path, the greatest tribute to Henri de Navarre is that he managed to keep his party together, to lead his people to victory and to place himself indisputedly on the throne of France. Contemporaries knew the value of his leadership, though of course, some of what they wrote was exaggeration for simple reasons of patronage. His chief ability was his management and manipulation of men; he could reason with them, inspire them and cajole them into actions beneficial to his cause. One historian has judged in a more political context: "The art of using men well, such was, such will still be and such will always be the real talent of Henri IV, with that of commanding them well."⁴ But the king also had greater military skills than usually are credited to him. With these skills added to his gifts of leadership, Henri de Navarre becomes a truly great commander. His thoroughness in organization, his attention to administrative detail, his reliance on personal example, his political sense and his compassion toward the distress of his people and soldiers combine to paint an admirable military portrait. Perhaps Sully best summed it up when he wrote of Henri de Navarre:

. . . what utility it is for a general of an army not only to possess that quality of the mind which embraces all possible contingencies, but to be acquainted with the names, abilities, and good or bad qualities of all the officers, as well as of the different bodies which compose his army, and in his turn to be known by them as the only one of all the general officers whose advice (the quality of leader apart) his soldiers would choose in any difficult conjuncture to follow as the wisest and best . . . to inspire them with a fondness for their occupation; to render their discipline pleasing . . . in a word, to possess the art of making himself be at all times readily obeyed by them. . . .⁵

It is a tribute to the ability of Henri IV, and a few of his commanders, that he was able to hold the party together in spite of the gaps that separated many divergent interests. Immediate military goals, like the siege of Paris, sometimes had to be abandoned in order that strategic objectives, above all the preservation of a united party, could be achieved. The risks involved were considerable, but so were the possible advantages, as the campaign, battle and aftermath of Arques were to prove. No historian seems to have ever considered that the battle represented the first victory of the new king, leading Catholics and Protestants together in a united party to the first military success of his reign. Success could never have been achieved with so few men in such a tenuous position without the close cooperation engendered by Henri's leadership. The party continued to remain disunited in attitude, personal designs and religious loyalties, which undoubtedly increased the duration of the war; but its unity of effort--wielded by the king toward a single goal--emerged as its strongest bond.

FOOTNOTES

¹The list is a long one. Of the Protestants, the dead include: the comte de Rohan, comte de Laval and his three brothers, Rieux, Sailly, Tanlay in 1586; the comte de La Marck in 1587; Prince de Condé and duc de Bouillon in 1588; comte de Richelieu circa. 1589; Cardinal de Bourbon and comte Clermont d'Enragues in 1590; the duc de Châtillon and comte de La Rochefoucault François de La Noue in 1591; duc de Montpensier in 1592; cardinal de Vendôme-Bourbon and sieur de Givry in 1594; and the sieur d'Humières in 1595. Of the Royalists under Henri III, the dead include: Henri III in 1589; duc de La Valette and maréchal de Biron in 1592; the marquis d'O in 1594; and duc de Nevers, duc de Longueville and maréchal d'Aumont in 1595. Of the Leaguers, the dead include: Anne de Joyeuse and comte de Saint-Sorlin in 1587; duc de Guise and cardinal de Lorraine in 1588; chevalier d'Aumale in 1590; Antoin-Scipio de Joyeuse in 1592; and duc de Nemours, sieur de Villars and comte de Saint-Pol in 1594.

²Sully, (Scott), p. 281.

³Matthieu, Heroyk life of Henry, pp. 31-32. Matthieu's observations on Parma's reluctance to invade France are confirmed by Van Der Essen in the chapters devoted to it in his biography of Parma.

⁴Dickerman, vol. II, p. 96. See also d'Aumale, vol. III, p. 145.

⁵Sully, (Scott), p.

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APPENDIX I


Coutras--20 October 1587. Fought between Henri de Navarre, leading his Huguenot army, and the duc de Joyeuse, leading a Catholic force superior in numbers. Threatened by another Catholic army, led by Marshal Matignon, which was marching toward him from the south, and caught between two rivers, Navarre turned on Joyeuse. In the ensuing battle, Navarre led his cavalry in a counterattack against the attacking League cavalry. The battle ended after one hour of fighting in which the Catholic army was virtually annihilated, Joyeuse being one of the slain. It was the first Huguenot victory in the field.

Arques--21 September 1589. With approximately 5,000 men, Henri IV took up a strong position in a narrow defile at Arques, five miles from Dieppe. Defended by marshy ground, the battlefield was of such a nature that a large enemy force could only bring against the king 5,000 troops at a time, thus neutralizing the disparity of numbers. When the duc de Mayenne assaulted with 30,000 men, attack after attack was repulsed with heavy loss. Having had no success after several days of fighting, Mayenne retreated northward, having lost nearly half of his army.

Ivry--14 March 1590. This battle was fought between 9,000-11,000 Huguenots, led by Henri IV, and 12,000-19,000 Leaguers, led by the duc de Mayenne. Recognizing the absolute need for a great victory against the League before his army separated, Henri IV forced Mayenne to attack him at Ivry, several

miles from Paris. After an initial artillery duel, the League cavalry was routed by a Protestant counterattack. Driven from the field, Mayenne fled, leaving the remnants of his army to be annihilated by the king's men. Henri succeeded in gaining the victory he so desperately needed and also broke the back of League strength.

Fontaine-Française--1595. In an attempt to renew the League fortunes, or at least save something from the wreckage of the League, the duc de Mayenne and a remnant of his forces met a Spanish army, advancing toward France via the Franche-Comté. Recognizing the threat to his position in Burgundy, Henri IV gathered together several thousand Huguenot cavalry and led them quickly to contain the enemy army until his infantry could support him in an attack. Seeing his opportunity for a quick victory against the Spanish, Henri suddenly attacked the enemy near the French border town of Fontaine-Française, without waiting longer for his infantry. In the ensuing mêlée, the Spanish were badly mauled. Although not destroyed, the Spanish commander refused to advance any further, retreating instead into the Franche-Comté. This battle virtually ended all League resistance.



VALOIS-ANGOULÊME

(ADAPTED FROM: J.H. SALMON, SOCIETY IN CRISIS: FRANCE IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY, APPENDIX.)

CATHERINE DE FOIX,
QUEEN OF NAVARRE
d. 1517
m. JEAN D'ALBRET
d. 1518

ISAIEAU D'ALBRET
d. 1565
m. RENÉ,
COMTE DE
ROHAN
d. 1552

HENRI D'ALBRET,
KING OF NAVARRE
d. 1555
m. MARQUERITE
D'ANGOULEME

JEANNE D'ALBRET
QUEEN OF NAVARRE
d. 1572

CHARLES DE BOURBON,
COMTE DE VENDÔME d. 1537
(DESCENDED IN THE EIGHTH
GENERATION FROM LOUIS IX)

m. ANTOINETTE DE BOURBON-
VANDÔME d. 1562

m. (1) ELÉONORE DE
ROYE d. 1564

LOUIS I^{ER}
PRINCE DE CONDÉ
d. 1569

(2) FRANÇOISE
D'ORLÉANS
d. 1601

CHARLES,
CARDINAL
DE BOURBON
("CHARLES X")
d. 1590

MARQUERITE
m. FRANÇOIS
DE BOURBON,
DUC DE
NEVERS
d. 1574

HENRI IV
d. 1610
m. (1) MARQUERITE
DE VALOIS
(2) MARIE
DE MEDICI
MARQUIS DU
PONT

HENRI I^{ER}
PRINCE DE
CONDÉ d. 1588
m. (1) MARIE
DE CLEVES
(2) CHARLOTTE
DE LA
TREMOLLE

FRANÇOIS
DE BOURBON
PRINCE DE
CONDÉ
d. 1614

CHARLES,
CARDINAL
DE BOURBON-
VENDÔME
d. 1594

CHARLES,
COMTES DE
SOISSONS
d. 1612
m. ANNE,
COMTESSE
DE MONTAISIÉ

HENRIETTE
DE CLEVES
d. 1601
m. LOUIS DE
GONZAQUE,
DUC DE
NEVERS

CATHERINE
DE CLEVES
d. 1633
m. HENRI,
DUC DE
GUISE

RENÉ, COMTE
DE ROHAN
d. 1586

m. CATHERINE
DE PARTHENAY
d. 1631

LOUIS XIII
d. 1643

HENRI II
PRINCE DE
CONDÉ
d. 1646
m. CHARLOTTE
DE MONTMORENCY

HENRI, DUC
DE ROHAN
d. 1638

BENJAMIN,
PRINCE DE
SOUSSE
d. 1648

Bourbon-Vendôme

GUILLAUME DE MONTMORENCY d.1531

LOUISE DE MONTMORENCY d.1547

m. (1) FERRY DE MAILLY

(2) GASPARD I^{er} DE CHÂTILLON d.1522

ANNE-ROBERT DE MONTMORENCY d.1567
m. MADELEINE DE SAVOIE-TENDE

MADELEINE d.1567

m. CHARLES, COMTE DE ROYE d.1552

ODET, CARDINAL-
BISHOP OF
BEAUVAIS
d.1571

m. CHARLOTTE
DE LAVAL d.1568

GASPARD II (COLIGNY)
d.1572

FRANÇOIS (D'ANDELOT)

ÉLÉONORE DE
ROYE d.1564

m. LOUIS I^{er}
PRINCE DE CONDÉ

CHARLOTTE DE
ROYE d.1567

m. FRANÇOIS DE LA
ROCHEFOUCAULD

LOUISE d.1620

m. (1) CHARLES
DE TELLIGNY
d.1591
(2) WILLIAM OF
ORANGE

FRANÇOIS
DE CHÂTILLON
d.1591

COMTE DE
LAVAL
d.1586

SEIGNEUR DE
SAILLY
d.1586
SEIGNEUR DE
TANLAY
d.1586
SEIGNEUR DE
RIEUX
d.1586

FRANÇOIS, MARÉCHAL
d.1579

m. DIANE DE VALOIS
(NATURAL DAUGHTER
OF HENRI II)

HENRI I^{er} (D'ANVILLE)
COUNSELLOR d.1614

m. (1) ANTOINETTE DE
LA MARCK d.1591

(2) LOUISE DE BUDOS
d.1598

GUILLAUME

GABRIEL

CHARLES

ÉLÉONORE
m. FRANÇOIS
DE LA TOURE,
VICOMTE DE
TURENNE

JEANNE
m. LOUIS DE
LA TRÉMOUILLE,
DUC DE
THOUARS

HERCULE
COMTE
d.1593

D'OFFEMONT
d.1593

CHARLOTTE
d.1636

m. CHARLES, DUC
D'ANGOUËME

MARGUERITE
m. ANNE d.1660

duc de
VENTADOUR

HENRI II
MARÉCHAL,
duc de
MONTMORENCY
d.1632

CHARLOTTE-
MARGUERITE d.1650
m. HENRI II,
PRINCE DE CONDÉ

HENRI, VICOMTE
DE TURENNE,
duc de
BOULION
d.1623

CHARLOTTE-
CATHERINE
m. HENRI I^{er}
DE CONDÉ



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